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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2010 when the late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, then leader of Libya, 
called for the disintegration of Nigeria along religious—Christian/Muslim—
lines, he no doubt, touched the nerves of Nigerian political leaders.1 Nigerian 
political leaders responded furiously. The Nigerian Senate President, David 
Mark, was reported to have said Colonel Gaddafi was a “mad man” and Nigeria 
withdrew its envoy to Libya the very next day.2 Although Colonel Gaddafi’s 
reputation may not have helped matters, it is, perhaps, true that the reaction of the 
Nigerian government reflects the seriousness states attach to the issue of 
secession. Understandably, it is an issue that concerns state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity just as it is one that concerns the fundamental principles upon 
which any state is founded. Yet, the late Colonel was not making his suggestion 
in a vacuum. He was joining in a series of calls for solutions to the peace and 
stability issues that confront Nigeria as a state and its people as a nation. 
Nigeria is experiencing various challenges to its continued existence as a 
single nation-state. The persistent religious and ethnic tensions which often 
culminate in inter-group violence have assumed a worrisome dimension since the 
return to democratic rule in the country in 1999.3 As recent developments show, 
 
1. Gaddafi Says Nigeria Should Split into Several States, BBC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2010, 3:08 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8593355.stm. 
2. Id. 
3. “Inter-group” is understood to mean ethnic and/or religious groups since both types of groups exist in 
Nigeria. The appropriateness of using the term “inter-group” to describe the nature of conflicts in Nigeria stems 
from the fact that conflicts in Nigeria sometimes arise between ethnic groups and at some other times between 
religious groups some of which may be of the same ethnicity. See generally Hanne Fjelde & Gudrun Ostby, 
Economic Inequality and Inter-Group Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2008, CIS Workshops, CENT. FOR 
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this volatile socio-polity has become not only inimical to the prospect of a 
national community, but has proved to be a potent danger to the country’s 
political unity. Specifically, there has been a rise in armed militias and inter-
group violence has caused more than 16,000 deaths since 1999.4 The emergence 
of the Islamic militant sect, Boko Haram, and its fatal rampages presents a recent 
form of violent group attacks in Nigeria. The estimated 164 attacks by Boko 
Haram since 2009 have resulted in about 935 deaths.5 That 425 of these deaths 
were recorded in the year 2011 alone attests to the deteriorating nature of the 
Boko Haram terror.6 Boko Haram, which means “western education is a sin” in 
Hausa language, widely spoken in Northern Nigeria, seeks a replacement of 
Western systems with those prescribed by Islam.7 This state of affairs was, 
perhaps, reaching its climax in Nigeria when on July 9, 2011 South Sudan 
declared its independence from Sudan.8 
Given the socio-political similarities between Nigeria and Sudan, the event of 
South Sudan’s independence gave increased impetus to agitations for a 
reconsideration of the Nigerian union. The clamor for a “Sovereign National 
Conference,” where the peoples of Nigeria would decide the political future of 
the state, has increased since then giving rise to yet another era of inter-group 
suspicion and general political unease.9 The fact that group accommodation 
continues to elude Nigeria fifty-two years after its independence, and the truth 
that stability is crucial to the much desired economic development in the country, 
makes this research timely. 
Generally, African states, especially those of the sub-Sahara, share common 
socio-polities born out of their analogous historical experiences. Still, writers 
agree that Nigeria and Sudan were peculiarly similar. As was with Sudan, 
Nigeria is often described along the religious line as a country with a Muslim 
North and a Christian South.10 The reality, however, is that conflict issues in 
 
COMP. & INT’L STUD. (Nov. 10-12, 2011), http://www.cis.ethz.ch/workshops/Workshop5/Paper_FjeldeOstby 
(providing study of economic inequality and violence across large number of countries). 
4. See Human Rights Watch, Country Summary: Nigeria, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 2 (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/nigeria_2012.pdf.  
5. “The group (Boko Haram) has claimed responsibility for bombing churches, police stations, military 
facilities, banks, and beer parlors, in northern Nigeria, as well as the United Nations building and police 
headquarters in Abuja, the nation’s capital.” Nigeria: Boko Haram Widens Terror Campaign, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/23/nigeria-boko-haram-widens-terror-campaign.  
6. See Human Rights Watch, Country Summary: Nigeria, supra note 4, at 1.  
7. Nigeria: Boko Haram Widens Terror Campaign, supra note 5.  
8. Mary Beth Sheridan & Rebecca Hamilton, South Sudan Secedes Amid Tensions, WASH. POST (July 7, 
2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-07-07/world/35236647_1_abyei-south-sudan-southern-kordo 
fan. It is important to clarify from the outset that Sudan as contemplated in this Article refers to pre-July 9, 2011 
Sudan when its territory included that of South Sudan. This is to ease the analyses and comparison intended 
here. 
9. See, e.g., Cornelius Omonokhua, Nigeria: Senator Flays Calls for Sovereign National Conference, 
DAILY TRUST (Nov. 4, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201211040174.html. 
10. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°113, NIGERIA: WANT IN THE MIDST OF PLENTY 1 (2006), 
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Nigeria and the factors which incite them transcend this casual description. As 
this Article will show, similar experiences in both Sudan and Nigeria have 
compounded the cleavages in their diversity creating a proclivity for inter-group 
conflict.11 However, this Article argues that a percipient look reveals some 
fundamental areas of divergence between the scenario that played out in Sudan 
and the Nigerian experience. These distinctions dictate different political futures 
for the two states. Specifically, while secession seemed always in the offing for 
post-colonial Sudan, Nigeria’s political future had always tilted away from the 
path of secession.12 
The independence of South Sudan comes from a series of events including a 
brutal civil war that lasted intermittently for about fifty years.13 The crux of the 
war was a struggle for self-government by the peoples of Southern Sudan who 
until 2005 were denied a space for self-determination within the Sudanese state. 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (“CPA”) signed by the government of 
Sudan and the Southern Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (“SPLM/A”) in 
2005 under the mediation of some international actors provided for an immediate 
southern autonomy and a referendum to be conducted six years later where the 
peoples of South Sudan would exercise their right to self-determination by 
deciding their political future.14 The declaration of an independent state of South 
Sudan was the result of the peoples’ decision at that referendum to secede.15 It is 
in comparison to this that this Article addresses secession in Nigeria.16 
Consequently, the question that drives this Article is whether Nigeria should 
follow the secessionist path of Sudan. I am conscious that this question is 
political and an attempt to give it legal expression will raise the issue whether the 
secession of any indigenous group from the existing Nigerian state can be 
 
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/nigeria%20want%20in%20the 
%20midst%20of%20plenty.pdf. 
11. Conflict is understood to mean “a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously 
to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals.” DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 95 (2d ed. 
2000). 
12. See generally Nosa Osaigbovo, The Road to Secession, NIGERIAN TRIBUNE (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://www.tribune.com.ng/index.php/mosaic/32178-the-road-to-secession (discussing the North’s attempt to 
secede from Nigeria). 
13. See Salman M. A. Salman, South Sudan’s Road to Independence: Broken Promises and Lost 
Opportunities, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 343 (2013).   
14. U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT 303: LEARNING FROM SUDAN’S 2011 REFERENDUM 2–3 
(2012), available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR303.pdf. 
15. See id. 
16. I am, however, not unmindful of the possible option of dissolution of the Nigerian Republic to give 
birth to geographically smaller republics as was the case with the former Yugoslavia or the former Mali 
Federation from where Senegal emerged. I am also not unmindful of the possibility of devolution in which case 
Nigeria may positively grant independence to any part of its current territory. The latter finds legitimacy in the 
doctrine of state sovereignty while in the case of the former there is no predecessor state whose assent may be 
relevant to legitimizing the independence of the new states especially where the dissolution is the result of the 
withdrawal of all or most of the territories that formed that state. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF 
STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 330, 390-91 (2d ed. 2006). 
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justified in international law. Whenever secession is considered, it calls to 
question the international law principle of self-determination. The principle is 
basically understood as the right of a group of people to be collectively self-
governing.17 The debate lingers among legal scholars whether an indigenous 
group within an existing state can, based on this right, secede from the existing 
state outside the context of decolonization and foreign subjugation.18 I argue that 
state practice along with judicial and scholarly opinions support the existence of 
this right and its availability to an indigenous group to secede from a state where 
it is oppressed and denied access to government. Eritrea and South Sudan are 
recent African examples. However, I argue that events in Nigeria, unlike Sudan, 
do not reach the threshold where this right becomes exercisable by any 
indigenous group in the state. Therefore, the secession of any indigenous group 
from the existing Nigerian state cannot be justified under international law. To 
conceive of secession absent the basic considerations that give rise to the vesting 
of the right to secede is to face yet another war in Nigeria, as evident in many 
states where the songs of independence or secession are chanted. 
Nevertheless, it is my opinion that events in Nigeria warrant a 
reconsideration of the political framework to ensure better group accommodation 
and coexistence. Nigeria is a federal state organized to foster integration. As I 
elaborate later, the politicization of diversity; the nature of the Nigerian 
federalism; corruption; and the resulting government dysfunction continue to 
make inter-group accommodation and co-existence problematic. Thus, these 
issues form the bane of inter-group conflicts in Nigeria. 
Bearing in mind that this Article contemplates Nigeria’s future, I rely on 
contemporary information and data in presenting the analyses. However, I shall 
make necessary allusions to historical experiences to explicate some socio-
political events in the modernity of Nigeria and Sudan. By way of background, 
Part II explores the similar nature and experiences of Sudan and Nigeria; and the 
fundamental areas of divergence in those experiences. This part argues that while 
Nigeria and Sudan may have shared similar experiences, their stories diverge in 
fundamental respects relevant to finding whether or not the right to secede as an 
exercise of the right to self-determination arises in Nigeria. Part III examines the 
legal framework for the right to self-determination and the legal parameters in 
which a right to secede may arise. This part considers events in Nigeria and 
examines them under the outlined legal framework for secession in finding that 
these events do not give rise to the right to secede in the Nigerian context. 
Finding that the panacea for conflict mitigation lies in the Nigerian political 
 
17. Margaret Moore, An Historical Argument for Indigenous Self-Determination, in SECESSION AND 
SELF-DETERMINATION 89, 89 (Stephen Macedo & Allen Buchanan eds., 2003). 
18. See generally id.; see also Donald L. Horowitz, A Right to Secede?, in SECESSION AND SELF-
DETERMINATION, supra note 17, at 50. Both articles present opposite arguments and analyses on whether or not 
the right to secede avails an indigenous group beyond the context of decolonization and alien subjugation.  
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system, Part IV examines the Nigerian political framework. Particularly, it 
examines the Nigerian constitutional federalism and the problems that stand in 
the way of its efficacy to adequately manage ethno-religious fragmentation, 
contain inter-group conflict, and ultimately foster a national community. Part V 
concludes that the time to act in the best regard of diversity management and 
conflict mitigation in Nigeria is now. This part calls on the Nigerian state to 
ponder on what options a reconstructed Nigerian federalism should adopt. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Nigeria and Sudan at a Glance 
Sudan, until 2011, was easily the largest country in Africa with a total area of 
about 2.5 million square kilometers (over 1.5 million square miles).19 Located in 
North East Africa, the country, with its capital in Khartoum, bordered nine 
countries (Central Africa Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, and Uganda).20 In 2010, Sudan had a population 
of 41,980,182.21 Its official language is Arabic.22  
Nigeria is a federal republic and its official name is the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria.23 The country is divided into thirty-six states and a Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja, which is the seat of its federal government.24 It is located in the 
Gulf of Guinea in West Africa and bordered by Cameroon to the East, Niger to 
the North, Chad to the Northeast and the Republic of Benin to the West. While 
Sudan was the largest country in Africa, Nigeria is the most populous country in 
Africa. Its official language is English and it has a total area of 923,768 square 
kilometers (about 574,003 square miles) which makes it a little more than twice 
the size of California.25 The country has an estimated population of about 
170,123,740.26 
 
19. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TWENTIETH CENTURY AFRICAN HISTORY 536 (Tiyambe Zeleza & Dickson Eyoh 
eds., 2003). 
20. Id. 
21. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 602 (2010). 
22. Id. 
23. The World Factbook: Nigeria, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
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B. Similar Features and Experiences of Nigeria and Sudan 
1. Ethnic and Religious Heterogeneity 
Religious and ethnic pluralism assume a complex pattern in both Sudan and 
Nigeria.27 Broadly speaking, Sudan was sixty-five percent African and thirty-five 
percent Arab.28 There were at least sixty five ethnic groups in Sudan which were 
further divided into about 600 tribes.29 The major groups which covered these 
ethnic and tribal divisions are the Arab groups settled in the north; the Negroid 
groups settled in the western parts and the south; and the Hamitic groups (Beja) 
settled in the east.30 The multi-linguistic nature of Sudan was a direct function of 
its multi-ethnicity. The country had a wide range of spoken languages and 
dialects estimated to be about 100.31 “Although Arabic is the official language of 
Sudan, English is predominant in the southern region . . . .”32 This complex 
ethnic/tribal pattern was also characterized by religious multiplicity. Islam was 
the dominant religion and accounted for about seventy percent of the Sudanese 
population; Christianity, five to ten percent; and other traditional/indigenous 
beliefs, twenty to twenty-five percent.33 
Nigeria is equally formed into a complex web of ethno-linguistic 
heterogeneity. There are about 250 ethnic groups and over 500 indigenous 
languages in Nigeria.34 Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba, concentrated in the 
North, East, and West respectively, are the major ethnic groups. There are 
hundreds of other minority ethnic groups scattered in the South-South and 
Middle-Belt (the region between the North and the South) regions of Nigeria. 
The proportion of the major ethnic groups in relation to the total population of 
the country is: Hausa-Fulani, twenty-nine percent; Yoruba, twenty-one percent; 
Igbo, eighteen percent; Ijaw, ten percent; Kanuri, four percent; Ibibio, three and a 
half percent; and Tiv, two and a half percent.35 As with Sudan, this ethno-
linguistic diversity is further characterized by religious distinctions. Islam (fifty 
 
27. Ethnicity is understood to mean groups differentiated by color, language, and/or culture. It covers 
tribes, races, nationalities, and castes. 
28. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°39, GOD, OIL AND COUNTRY: CHANGING THE LOGIC OF WAR 
IN SUDAN 6 (2002), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/ 
God%20Oil%20and%20Country%20Changing%20the%20Logic%20of%20War%20in%20Sudan.pdf. 
29. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BESET BY CONTRADICTIONS: ISLAMIZATION, LEGAL REFORM 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUDAN 5 (1996).  
30. OMER AWADALLA ALI GASMELSEID, FEDERALISM AS CONFLICT-MANAGEMENT DEVICE FOR 
MULTIETHNIC AND MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES—THE CASE OF SUDAN 6 (2006). 
31. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 29, at 5. 
32. Id. 
33. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°39, supra note 28, at 6. 
34. U.S. Embassy in Nigeria, Nigeria Fact Sheet (Jan. 2012), available at http://photos.state.gov/ 
libraries/nigeria/487468/pdfs/Nigeria%20overview%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. 
35. Id. 
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percent) is largely practiced in the North and Christianity (forty percent) mainly 
in the South.36 There are also numbers of diverse indigenous beliefs (twenty-five 
percent).37 
As post-independence events in Nigeria and Sudan show, this heterogeneity 
has often been the background of a volatile socio-political landscape in both 
countries. Thus, the nature of conflicts in Nigeria and Sudan can be explained 
with reference to specific experiences in both states. 
2. Slave Trade 
Slave trade contributed to the checkered socio-political history of Sudan and 
Nigeria. During the Ottoman colonial era in Sudan, slave trade was imposed only 
on Southern Sudanese Africans and the Northern Sudanese were used as slave 
raiders, slave agents and soldiers in the search for slaves.38 The impact of this era 
on diversity and conflict in Sudan cannot be overemphasized given the mutual 
reproach it created among the peoples of the North and the South.39 Similarly, the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade transformed the relationship among the peoples that 
now comprise Nigeria. Since the benefits and costs of failure in the trade were so 
great, relationships among kingdoms at that time became increasingly predatory 
and violent as they moved into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.40 
3. Colonial Rule 
Both Sudan and Nigeria were former colonies of Britain.41 Although Sudan 
had experienced Ottoman (Turko-Egyptian) colonial rule from 1821 to 1885, 
much of the administrative vestiges that were to have political implications on its 
socio-polity were left by the Anglo-Egyptian colonialists.42 Like Sudan, the 
territories that make up Nigeria were independent kingdoms and empires before 
colonial presence.43 The amalgamation of the Northern and Southern 
protectorates of Nigeria in 1914 gave birth to what is known today as Nigeria.44 
The indirect rule system of government that was synonymous with British 
 
36. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 21, at 602. 
37. Id. 
38. GASMELSEID, supra note 30, at 18-19. 
39. Id. at 6. 
40. APRIL A. GORDON, NIGERIAN’S DIVERSE PEOPLES: A REFERENCE SOURCE BOOK 43 (2003). 
41. Nigeria: History, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/414840/ 
Nigeria (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
42. Sudan: History, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/571417/ 
Sudan (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
43. Nigeria: History, supra note 41. 
44. Id. 
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colonialism in Africa was common to both Nigerian and Sudanese colonial 
administrations.45 
However, colonial rule set the pace for socio-economic imbalance in both 
countries. The Anglo-Egyptian colonial era in Sudan encouraged the spread of 
Islamic culture in the North through Egyptian presence in the Condominium, 
while Christian missionaries developed Christianity and Western culture in the 
South. Much of the education and economic investments were concentrated in 
the North of Sudan while the colonialists relied on Christian missionaries for 
education and economic development in the South.46 The result was a lopsided 
development leading to what has been called the “northern superiority complex” 
in Sudan.47 This was also the case in Nigeria where colonial administration 
discouraged Christian missionaries from the North thereby concentrating western 
education in the South.48 The idea at the time was to maintain the sanctity of 
Islam and the traditional order which was then a leftover of the Caliphate 
primacy in the North. 
4. Oil Resource 
Oil is the major resource in Sudan and Nigeria. It accounts for about eighty 
percent of budgetary revenues in Nigeria49 and was instrumental to the economic 
boom that was experienced in Sudan from 1999 when oil exportation began.50 
Like Sudan, the oilfields in Nigeria are in the South. The failures of successive 
Nigerian governments to encourage genuine power sharing have sparked 
dangerous rivalries between the center and the thirty-six states over revenue from 
the country’s oil.51 The oil resource problem is most acute in the oil rich, but 
desperately poor Niger Delta, where between 2006 and 2010, the Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (“MEND”) and other armed militias waged 
a violent campaign against the federal government and foreign oil companies.52 
Although agitations in the Niger-Delta are less violent today, the demands by the 
peoples of the region for local control of the Niger-Delta’s oil wealth remains. It 
is significant that the burgeoning campaigns for the reconsideration of the 
Nigerian political union coincide with the location of the oilfields in the country. 
 
45. Id.; Sudan: History, supra note 42. 
46. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 29, at 10. 
47. GASMELSEID, supra note 30, at 48-49. 
48. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°168, NORTHERN NIGERIA: BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT 5 
(2010), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/168 Northern Nigeria -
Background to Conflict.pdf. 
49. The World Factbook: Nigeria, supra note 23. 
50. Id. 
51. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°119, NIGERIA’S FALTERING FEDERAL EXPERIMENT  (2006), 
available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/Nigerias%20Faltering%20 
Federal%20Experiment.pdf. 
52. Id. 
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These campaigns emanate from the southern groups in Nigeria while the northern 
groups remain adamant to the idea of reconsidering the Nigerian political union. 
There is a deep sense of alienation and dissatisfaction felt by the groups in the 
South especially of the littoral Niger-Delta region. The feeling is that their 
environment is degraded and their wealth explored to support the federal 
government and the northern states.53 The arbitrary execution of the activist, Ken 
Saro Wiwa and others from the Ogoni area of the Niger-Delta in 1995, who 
demanded a greater share in oil revenues and environmental protection by the 
Sani Abacha military regime, caused Nigeria’s suspension from the 
Commonwealth of Nations54 and continues to be a source of bitterness among the 
groups in the Niger-Delta. 
“The situation in Sudan was complicated by the discovery of oil in the 
southern provinces during the 1970s . . . .”55 President Jafaar Nimeiri’s attempt to 
redraw the internal boundaries of the country to bring the oilfields in the South 
within northern boundaries caused a deterioration in the tension in Sudan and 
provided additional motivation for conflict and war.56 Given the failure of this 
attempt, Nimeiri subsequently resorted to an arrangement where the oil drilled in 
the South were refined in the North.57 The denial of Southern Sudanese access to 
their resource and the massive displacement of the southern groups settled 
around the oilfields by General Omar al Bashir to allow oil exploration increased 
bitterness among the southern groups.58 The resulting feeling of oppression and 
alienation associated with oil exploration in Sudan propelled the Sudanese civil 
war and ultimately southern independence. On the other hand, the returns from 
oil exploration gave Khartoum a reason to continue its resistance to a southern 
secession.59 
5. Military Rule 
As with most African states, Sudan and Nigeria have experienced their share 
of military intervention in politics by way of coup d’état, which has not only 
contributed to socio-political instability in the countries, but has also derailed 
consistency in economic policies. Government in Sudan has, since independence 
in 1956, oscillated between military dictatorships and civilian parliamentary 
 
53. Id. 
54. E.g., Nigeria, The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed., INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease. 
com/encyclopedia/world/nigeria-history.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
55. Stephen J. Kobrin, Oil and Politics: Talisman Energy and Sudan, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 425, 
432 (2003) (citation omitted). 
56. See id. 
57. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°39, supra note 28, at 12. 
58. Id. 
59. See id. at 13. 
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coalition governments.60 Post-colonial military rule in Sudan provided the 
unchecked powers that were employed arbitrarily especially in the oppression of 
the southern groups. 
The first military coup in Nigeria (January 15, 1966), whether or not it was 
so intended, had an ethnic flavor. It was largely masterminded by military 
officers of Igbo origins with a number of prominent Hausa-Fulani casualties 
including the then Prime Minister of Nigeria, Alhaji (Sir) Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa, and the then Sarduana of Sokoto, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello.61 The then 
Governor-General of Nigeria, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, and the Premier of the 
Eastern region, both prominent Igbo leaders, survived the coup.62 There was also 
the killing of prominent politicians from other regions of the country and the 
emergence of the then commanding officer of the Nigerian Army, General 
Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, of Igbo origin, as Head of State.63 The Hausa-Fulani, who 
saw this as an attack against them, reacted six months later in what took the form 
of a “revenge coup.”64 These coups and the subsequent catastrophic Nigerian civil 
war, which they directly precipitated, remain major post-colonial events that 
delved devastating cleavage on ethnic and religious dichotomy in Nigeria.65 
C. Fundamental Differences Between the Nigerian and Sudanese Experiences 
The analogous nature and socio-political experiences of Sudan and Nigeria 
are far-reaching to justify an allusion to the recent secession of South Sudan in 
the discourse of Nigerian’s stability, group coexistence, and political future. 
However, as already indicated, the stories diverge in fundamental respects that 
are crucial to the consideration of secession in both states. With rudimentary 
factors such as evolution of the state, state actions, and the presence of a “target 
people” within an existing state becoming increasingly central to secession in 
contemporary international law, it is only reasonable to give these issues their 
due consideration. 
1. Evolution of the States 
Although Sudan and Nigeria evolved from British imperialism, the agenda of 
the colonialists as reflected in their policies in the two states were significantly 
different. From the amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates of 
Nigeria in 1914, the colonial intention, mostly based on economic and 
 
60. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 29, at 10.  
61. Nigeria: History, supra note 41. 
62. See Nnamdi Azikiwe, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 
46875/Nnamdi-Azikiwe (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
63. TOYIN FALOLA & MATTHEW M. HEATON, A HISTORY OF NIGERIA 116 (2008). 
64. Id. at 118 
65. Id. at 119. 
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infrastructural efficiency, was to create a single state of diverse peoples.66 The 
reverse was the case with British-Sudan where the colonial authorities moved to 
create two separate and distinct states of the North and South. 
“Like many colonial creations, Sudan amalgamated territories and peoples 
that had never previously been a coherent entity.”67 The most extensive indication 
that Sudan was not a coherent union, nor was it thought as such by its peoples 
and the colonialists, was evident in the Anglo-Egyptian colonial era. The Anglo-
Egyptian condominium saw Britain take management over Southern Sudan, 
leaving the North under nominal Egyptian rule.68 One major policy of this 
administration was the Southern Policy of 1917,69 which “closed off” the south of 
Sudan.70 The ultimate aim was to create a new political entity or merge the 
southern territory with other British colonies in Africa—Uganda and Kenya—
who the British rulers thought were more similar.71 On the other hand, Northern 
Sudan was to be annexed to Egypt in cognizance of the latter’s historical ties 
with the former.72 Consequently, there was the establishment of a new military 
task force in the South, comprised of southerners to replace the northern 
military;73 the declaration of English as the official language in the South, and a 
promotion of local languages as opposed to Arabic as a lingua franca; a denial of 
northerners’ entry into the South unless permitted; the discouragement and 
reduction of inter-marriage between the North and the South; and a replacement 
of Friday with Sunday as the weekly holiday in the South.74 
The growth of Sudanese nationalism in the years leading to World War II 
increased the prospect of a Sudanese independence. With pressure from Egypt, 
Northern Sudanese elites and British-French-Egyptian politics over the Suez 
Canal, Britain was prepared to sacrifice the agenda of a separate independence 
for South Sudan75 despite opposition from British colonial officers working in the 
South and Southern Sudanese groups.76 Southern agitations for self-government 
 
66. Nigeria: History, supra note 41. 
67. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°39, supra note 28, at 7. 
68. Id. at 8. 
69. Legitimized by the promulgation of the Closed District Ordinance of 1921 and the Passports and 
Permits Ordinance of 1922 was promulgated to allow access from other parts of Sudan to South Sudan only 
with the permission of the authorities.  
70. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°39, supra note 28, at 7. 
71. PETER PIGOTT, CANADA IN SUDAN 88 (2009); see also GASMELSEID, supra note 30, at 24. 
72. Angela M. Lloyd, Note, The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case for Secession, 32 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 419, 440 (1994). 
73. This was significant for the role it played in the first phase of the civil war. The refusal of the 
Southern soldiers to handover to the Northern troops towards the end of British rule (the mutiny of Torit, 1955 
in Equatoria) was one of the direct causes of the first phase of the Sudanese civil war which lasted seventeen 
years. 
74. GASMELSEID, supra note 30, at 23. 
75. Lloyd, supra note 72, at 440-41. 
76. FED. RESEARCH DIV., LIBRARY OF CONG., SUDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 29-31 (Helen Chapin Metz 
ed., 4th ed. 1992). 
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increased, culminating in a violent conflict in 1955 some months before 
Sudanese independence on January 1, 1956.77 The rebellious southern troops 
mutinied in August 1955 killing several northerners, government officers, and 
army officers.78 Assurances from the North and the British colonialists that the 
South would be allowed some form of autonomy became an empty promise 
when, at the dawn of independence, the northerners sought to circumvent this 
understanding. For instance, “in September 1956, the Legislative Assembly 
appointed a committee to draft a national constitution; only three of the forty six 
members were southerners. The southern delegation walked out in protest after 
its repeated calls for a federal constitution were outvoted.”79 In spite of the 
government’s suppression, the southern groups convinced of their demand for 
self-government regrouped in remote areas to continue their agitation mostly by 
guerilla warfare.80 By 1958 they, had from exile, formed the Sudan African 
National Union which petitioned the United Nations and the Organization of 
African Union (now African Union or “AU”) on their right to self-
determination.81 
In marked difference to the Sudanese notion of two separate states, Nigeria 
was regarded as one political entity by its peoples and the colonial authorities 
since the 1914 amalgamation. British-Nigeria was administered as a single 
unified state of different regions. There was no colonial agenda to separate the 
peoples of Nigeria,82 nor was there any indication on the part of the Nigerian 
peoples that they were so separate and distinct and as such required separate 
independence.83 Events leading to independence did not entail separate 
independence agitations; rather, they were in the nature of determining a suitable 
political structure that would meet the ends of peaceful coexistence.84 
After British conquest of the territories now comprising Nigeria, the earliest 
form of administration was indirect—through the already well-established local 
administrative institutions. The idea was to maintain order and promote 
continuity so that the imperialist ends could be achieved without rancor.85 The 
first British Governor-General of Nigeria, Lord Fredrick Lugard, was pro-central 
in his administrative form and ideology.86 Consequently, he sought uniformity in 
 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 31-32. 
79. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°39, supra note 28, at 9. 
80. FED. RESEARCH DIV., supra note 76, at 31-32. 
81. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°39, supra note 28, at 9. 
82. See FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 63, at 110-34. 
83. Nigeria: History, supra note 41. 
84. Id. 
85. FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 63, at 112. 
86. Id. at 68. 
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the administrative structure, thus reinforcing indirect rule in the South87 to bring it 
in conformity with the nature of administration in the north.88 
Nationalism in colonial Nigeria was in two major phases—before and after 
World War II—neither of which included agitations for separate group 
independence. First, as more Nigerians acquired western education, there 
emerged a Nigerian elite class shortly after the amalgamation.89 The imperial 
ideology of African inferiority soon caused a mutual reproach between the 
colonial authorities and these elites that snowballed into nationalist agitations in 
the 1920s.90 The immediate result of these agitations was the adoption of the 1922 
Clifford’s Constitution which allowed a limited Nigerian representation in the 
newly formed legislative council.91 Agitations at the time were to refute the idea 
of African inferiority and to press for greater representation in the colonial 
government.92 Increase in awareness, the emergence of trade/labor unions, and 
the effects of the new but vibrant Nigerian press gave increased impetus to 
nationalism in the following years which continued to see increased Nigerian 
representation in the colonial administration.93 However, with increased political 
participation, the peoples of Nigeria were identified as not only divided along 
ethnic lines, but were also deeply ethnocentric.94 The dominant groups in 
Nigerian politics at the time were the Igbo, the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani.95 
Second, post-World War II, there was a willingness to end colonialism led by 
the United Nations. This promised independence for Nigeria and nationalism 
shifted from greater participation to agitations for self-government. The 
consideration then was a political structure that would unite an ethno-religiously 
divided Nigeria. This explains the adoption of three different constitutions 
between 1946 and 1954.96 Although the 1946 Richards Constitution, which 
introduced regionalism, was arbitrarily imposed, the drafting of the subsequent 
1951 Macpherson Constitution included Nigerian nationalists, some of who 
preferred a system that would unite Nigeria.97 It may surprise many today that, 
for instance, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (“NCNC”), a 
political party led by one of Nigeria’s foremost nationalists in history, Dr. 
 
87. Especially in the decentralized and chief-less southeast societies where Lord Lugard created the 
position of warrant chiefs in a bid to find a symbol of authority that was comparable or similar to the Emirs of 
the North and the Obas of the West. FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 63, at 69. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 77. 
90. Id. at 82. 
91. E.g., Itse Sagay, Nigeria: Federalism, the Constitution and Resource Control, URHOBO WAADO, 
http://www.waado.org/nigerdelta/essays/resourcecontrol/sagay.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2013). 
92. FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 63, at 84. 
93. FED. RESEARCH DIV., supra note 76, at 38-40. 
94. Id.; see also FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 63, at 152. 
95. FALOLA & HEATON, supra note 63, at 152. 
96. Id. at 90-93; see also FED. RESEARCH DIV., supra note 76, at 44. 
97. TOYIN FALOLA, THE HISTORY OF NIGERIA 90-92 (1999). 
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Nnamdi Azikiwe, preferred a central structure to the Richards Constitution’s 
regionalism on the grounds that it would unite rather than divide Nigeria.98 It was 
in response to such feelings that the Macpherson Constitution established a 
relatively more central form of government in 1951 for purposes of national 
integration.99 The people of Nigeria, who although were conscious of their 
distinct ethnic and religious identities, never evinced an intention for, nor did 
they positively demand, separate independence.100 The understanding that a 
single, unified political entity was formed by the 1914 amalgamation continued 
through independence and afterwards.101 
Professor Eghosa E. Osaghae argues that nationalists who participated in 
creating the political structures that emerged in Nigeria at independence were 
forced to work within the framework dictated by the imperialists and as a result 
they could not opt out of the “union.”102 With the greatest respect to the Professor, 
this argument does not defeat the proposition that the peoples of Nigeria did not 
intend separate independence. Nor does the argument suffice to debunk the claim 
that positive demands for separate states may have been relevant to the political 
structure that became the outcome of Nigeria’s independence. There are at least 
two issues which explain the point being made here. 
First, the position of the United Nations, which was the international 
champion of decolonization, was to defer to the wishes of the colonized people as 
much as it was possible.103 The advisory opinion of International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”) in Western Sahara avows for this position.104 Although this opinion 
antedates Nigeria’s independence, it is reflective of the prevalent attitude in the 
wake of decolonization, especially state practice founded in UN Resolution 
1514.105 
Second, had Nigerians decisively intended separate states, they acquired the 
needed sovereignty upon the attainment of self-government to decide their future 
as such. The British colonial style, and indeed under the international law 
 
98. Id. at 90. 
99. See id. at 92 (the McPhereson Constitution retained the three-region structure of the Richards 
Constitution, but gave the north equal representation to the other two regions combined). 
100. See generally id. at  90-93. 
101. See id. at 68. 
102. Eghosa E. Osaghae, Federalism and the Management of Diversity in Africa, 5 IDENTITY, CULTURE 
& POL., no. 1 & 2, 2004 at 162, 165-66 (2004), available at http://www.codesria.org/IMG/pdf/eghosa.pdf. 
103. See ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF- DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 76-79 (1995). 
104. The court stated that: 
The validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to freely 
expressed will of the peoples, is not affected by the fact that in certain cases the General 
Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of a given territory. 
Those instances were based either on the consideration that a certain population did not 
constitute a ‘people’ entitled to self-determination or on the conviction that a consultation was 
totally unnecessary, in view of special circumstances.  
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 33, para. 59 (Oct. 16). 
105. S.C. Res. 1514, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1514 (Nov. 13, 2003). 
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principle of sovereignty, was to “nurture” the colony into self-government from 
where it was entitled to decide its future.106 The scenario that played out in Sudan 
explains this position. Nationalism in the North of Sudan, as independence 
approached, was divided along whether to emerge as an independent state or to 
merge with Egypt.107 The Chairman of the Commission tasked to resolve this 
issue, Mr. Eden, reported the following to the House of Commons in England on 
November 15, 1951: 
Having attained self-government it will be for the Sudanese people to 
choose their own future status and relationship with the Kingdom and 
with Egypt. His Majesty’s Government consider that the attainment of 
self-government should immediately be followed by active preparations 
for the ultimate goal of self-determination. They will support the 
Governor-General in his efforts to ensure that the Sudanese people shall 
be able to exercise their choice in complete freedom and in the full 
consciousness of their responsibilities.108 
The point being made here is far from finding justification for the arbitrary 
joining of territories, as was the character of colonialism; rather, it is that the 
groups in Nigeria, if at all they felt otherwise, nevertheless acquiesced to the 
colonial amalgamations that gave birth to Nigeria.109 The only time groups in the 
East made a positive move for a separate independence was in 1967, and at that 
time, tribal nerves had become too charged that the underlying issues at play 
were driven more by ethnic vengeance than by pragmatic political 
considerations.110 More so, the emergence of military rule at the time had robbed 
the socio-polity of the avenue for robust deliberations and popular consultations 
that is crucial to the issue of secession.111 The result was a thirty-month war that 
claimed well over 500,000 lives.112 
2. Religion and the State 
As Donald L. Horowitz writes, “[w]hether and when a secessionist 
movement will emerge is determined mainly by domestic politics, by the 
relations of groups and regions within the state.”113 The nature of conflicts in 
divided societies around the world illustrate that the role of the state with respect 
 
106. UMOZURIKE OJI UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 145-48 (1972). 
107. Id. at 146-47. 
108. Id. at 147 (emphasis added). 
109. Id. at 146-47. 
110. See generally id. 
111. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°119, supra note 51, at 2. 
112. Id. 
113. HOROWITZ, supra note 11, at 230. 
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to religion is at the heart of peace and stability, especially in religiously plural 
settings.114 Both Nigeria and Sudan have seen religious politicization ignite and 
propel conflict.115 As Emmy Irobi and Anthony O. Agwuele point out, “[a]nother 
major cause of conflict in Nigeria is the politicization of religion, namely, the 
fusion of religion and politics.”116 While this is true, it is imperative to stress that 
the nature of religious politicization in Nigeria assumes a dimension distinct from 
what was the case in Sudan.117 Successive Nigerian governments have been 
neutral to religion in consonance with the apparent secular posture of the 
country’s successive constitutions.118 However, as Francis M. Deng points out, 
post-independence Sudanese governments have been persistent in their efforts to 
“Arabize” or “Islamize” the country, which was hitherto administered as two 
separate entities by British colonialism.119 
As already said, the two colonial eras in Sudan created a socio-economic 
imbalance between the North and South which resulted in a “northern superiority 
complex.”120 This complex, coupled with the numerical preponderance of Islam 
in the North and indeed the entire Sudan, resulted in a religious and cultural 
majoritarianism that was inordinately pursued through the machinery of state 
powers in Sudanese nation building.121 Having experienced two short-lived 
civilian coalition governments, a November 1958 coup brought Major-General 
Ahmad Abboud to power.122 “Gen[eral] Abboud launched a controversial effort to 
accelerate ‘Islamisation’ of the [S]outh through an aggressive proselytizing 
campaign.”123 In 1964, he expelled all western missionaries in the South of 
Sudan.124 His repression forced thousands of southerners into exile where they, 
more than before, began to unionize as resistance groups and a renewed civil war 
in the mid-1960s was not far away.125 
 
114. See generally Andrew Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman, & Brian Min, Ethnic Politics and Armed 
Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a new Global Dataset, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 316, 316-17 (2009). 
115. PIGOTT, supra note 71, at 2; INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°168, supra note 48, at 2. 
116. Emmy Irobi & Anthony O. Agwuele, The Relevance of Rotational Presidency in Managing Ethnic 
Conflicts in Nigeria, in HEMISPHERES STUDIES ON CULTURES AND SOCIETIES NO. 22 33, 35 (Jerzy Zdanowski 
et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.iksio.pan.pl/images/publikacje/Hemispheres/do_nr_30/hemispheres 
22.pdf#page=35. 
117. FRANCIS M. DENG, CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD: THE CROSSFIRE OF SUDAN’S WAR 
OF IDENTITIES 6-7 (2010); Jeremiah Shola Omotola, Secularism and the Politics of Religious Balancing in 
Nigeria, http://www.irmgard-coninx-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Cultural_Pluralism/Religion/Essay. 
Omotola.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
118. Omotola, supra note 117. 
119. DENG, supra note 117, at 6-7. 
120. GASMELSEID, supra note 30, at 49-50. 
121. Omotola, supra note 117 (Arabs of the North felt superior to the Africans of the South due to their 
association with slavery, which was fueled by the disparate treatment by the British early in their rule). 
122. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°39, supra note 28, at 8-9. 
123. Id. at 9.   
124. FED. RESEARCH DIV., supra note 76, at xxiv. 
125. Id. 
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This was the socio-political setting when President Jaafar Nimeiri became 
President of Sudan in 1969 after a coup.126 A failed communist coup in Sudan in 
July 1971 disturbed Sudan-Soviet relations leading to the Soviets withdrawing 
their support for the Sudanese government in the civil war.127 The economics of 
continuing the war without Soviet support motivated President Nimeiri to address 
the war.128 The result was the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement between 
Khartoum and the peoples of South Sudan, which gave the latter regional 
autonomy.129 It was against this background that the first permanent Constitution 
of Sudan, which reflected secularism, was adopted in 1972.130 
However, this turned out to be temporary when President Nimeiri, in a 
sudden reversal, promulgated the 1983 September Laws adopting Shari’a and its 
penal sanctions in a renewed bid to Islamize the entire Sudan.131 This time his 
immediate motives were to pacify the Islamic Brotherhood with whom he had 
found reconciliation and a renewed alliance.132 There was also the need to weaken 
southern coherence and formidability in order to forestall their resistance to his 
attempt to bring the newly found oil in some parts of the South within the 
boundaries of the North.133 When Nimeiri was overthrown in 1985, the 
succeeding government of Lieutenant General Swar al-Dhahab instituted a peace 
process, which, however, could not resolve the “Shari’a question.”134 The 
subsequent transition government showed deference to the demands of the 
SPLM/A and set the motion in place for a National Constitutional Conference.135 
The government showed its commitment to peace by expelling members of the 
National Islamic Front (“NIF”) in the cabinet.136 The NIF responded by 
supporting a coup on June 30, 1989, which brought General Omar al-Bashir to 
power.137 Since the northern Islamic supremacists never accepted the September 
Laws as true Shari’a and had played a supportive role in the coming to power of 
General al-Bashir, it became a crucial part of the latter’s agenda to upgrade and 
reinforce the laws to properly reflect Shari’a.138 
 
126. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°39, supra note 28, at 9-10. 
127. Id. at 10-11.   
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 11. 
130. Id. 
131. The Penal Code was rewritten to include the punishments of flogging, amputation, and crucifixion. 
Constitutional provisions that were contrary to Islamic laws were suspended. See LAWYERS COMM. FOR 
HUMAN, supra note 29, at 14-15. 
132. Id. at 15.  
133. Kobrin, supra note 55, at 432. 
134. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°39, supra note 28, at 14. 
135. Id.  
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. DENG, supra note 117, at 7; INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°39, supra note 28, at 14. 
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In tandem with the aspirations and objectives of the NIF, General Bashir has 
long declared his government an Islamic one committed to establishing an 
Islamic state,139 augmenting the regular police with the ad-hoc Morality and 
General Discipline Police to deal with offences of morality, which are largely 
dictated by Islamic injunctions.140 Feeble attempts at peace under General Bashir 
continued to fail with Islamic law again being the crux of deadlock until January 
2005, when the CPA was signed.141 
General Bashir ruled mainly by constitutional decrees and promulgations 
until 1998 when his government adopted a constitution.142 Prominent among the 
provisions of the Constitution regarded by non-Muslims as unacceptable 
included Article 10, which imposed Zakat143 as a financial duty on the entire 
country without a limitation to Muslims, and Article 65, which gave “Islamic 
Law” supremacy by placing it alongside “consensus of the nation”, “the 
Constitution” and “custom” as the fundamental sources of legislation “which no 
law can contravene.”144 Several other articles of the Constitution were seen as 
problematic in view of the religious diversity of Sudan.145 
While the foregoing identifies a Sudanese state marked by religious and 
cultural fundamentalism,146 the Nigerian case has largely seen religious 
politicization take the form of individuals who sometimes conspire to whip up 
religious sentiments mostly for political gains.147 Religion started to rear its head 
in the public sphere of post-independence Nigeria in constitutional 
deliberations.148 Shari’a created tensions during the constitutional convention that 
founded the 1979 Constitution. The request of the Muslim delegation at the time 
was the establishment of a Shari’a court of appeals at the federal judicial level.149 
 
139. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 29, at 3. 
140. Id. at 22. 
141. Bashir Aide Challenges Opposition to Declare Stance on Sharia Laws, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Nov. 11, 
2012), http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44497. 
142. Article 1 declares “the State of Sudan is an embracing homeland, wherein races and cultures 
coalesce and religions conciliate. Islam is the religion of the majority of the population. Christianity and 
customary creeds have considerable followers.” CONSTITUTION OF SUDAN (1998), art. 1, available at 
http://www.sudanembassy.ca/Docs/THE%20CONSTITUTION%20OF%20THE%20REPUBLIC%20OF%20T
HE%20SUDAN%201998.pdf; Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, SUDAN TRIBUNE, http://www.sudantribune. 
com/+-OMAR-HASSAN-AL-BASHIR,126-+ (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
143. The word literally means “Alms” and is regarded as one of the pillars of Islam. The practice involves 
giving to charity for self-purification. 
144. CONSTITUTION OF SUDAN (1998), art. 10. 
145. These include: Articles 4, 18, 24. CONSTITUTION OF SUDAN (1998) (for example, Article 4 indicating 
God is supreme, and Article 18 requiring those serving the State to worship God and stick to Muslim scripture). 
146. CONSTITUTION OF SUDAN (1998); LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 29, at 3. 
147. See Juwayriya Badamasiuy & Ahmed Adam Okene, Shari’ah Implementation in a Democratic 
Nigeria: Historical Background and the Quest for Developmental Legality, 4 J. POL. & L. 144, 147 (2011), 
available at http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/viewFile/12005/8428. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. (indicating the desire of Christian politicians in the 1988/89 Constituent Assembly a total 
abrogation of Shari'ah law in the constitution created social tension). 
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This issue defied resolution at the deliberations and so “the Supreme Military 
Council (“SMC”), the highest ruling body of the military regime then, arrived at 
a compromise by retaining the provision for the establishment of the Shari’ah 
court for any state, which required it.”150 Debates over Shari’a were even more 
fierce in the 1988/89 Constituent Assembly and this time the Armed Forces 
Ruling Council (“AFRC”), the successor to the SMC, intervened by making 
issues of Shari’a non-debatable in the Assembly.151 The 1994/95 and the 1998 
Constitutional Conferences were less acrimonious.152 The latter, while largely 
adopting recommendations of the 1994/95 Constituent Assembly, is the basis for 
the current Nigerian Constitution of 1999.153 In 1986, the Nigerian Head of State, 
General Muhammad Buhari, controversially secured a Nigerian membership at 
the Organization of Islamic Conference (now Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation or “OIC”).154 The issue generated deep tension among Christians and 
Muslims culminating in a conflagration that spread across many cities in 
Northern Nigeria.155 
The expansion of Shari’a from personal law into the criminal justice system 
by some northern states immediately after the transition to civil rule in 1999 saw 
the federal government maintain a position that the expansion was incompatible 
with the constitutional right of freedom of religion.156 The implementation of 
Shari’a has been limited to the adopting states that incidentally are the Muslim 
majority states and, individually, it has been applied to adherents of Islam.157 
Beyond the fact that the incident did not distort the federal government’s 
neutrality on religion, it was far from being a foisting of Shari’a on the entire 
Nigeria.158 It is worthy of note that even some Muslim dominated states in the 
North and Middle-Belt have resisted the implementation of the law.159 Boko 
Haram and its extremism present the most recent affront to freedom of religion 






153. Badamasiuy & Okene, supra note 147, at 147. 
154. FED. RESEARCH DIV., supra note 76, at 81. 
155. Irobi & Agwuele, supra note 116, at 39-40. 
156. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°168, supra note 48, at 1. 
157. Id. 
158. Rotimi T. Suberu, Reinventing the Architecture of Nigerian Federalism, 12 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 
139, 145 (2005-2006). 
159. These states include Nasarawa, Kogi, Taraba, Adamawa, and Kwara. See id. 
160. See supra Part I. 
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3. State Actions 
State actions in relation to a particular group within the state, usually in the 
nature of human rights violations and oppression, are another area where the 
experience in Nigeria differs from that of Sudan. I will elaborate on this further 
in the next part since it is directly implicated in assessing whether a right to 
secede has arisen in Nigeria. However, it suffices to mention here that unlike 
Nigeria, the Sudanese government was characteristic of making specific groups 
within the state targets for human rights violations and oppression.161 Perhaps, it 
is significant on this score that the war between Khartoum and the groups in 
Southern Sudan was quickly followed by violent conflict between Khartoum and 
the peoples of the Darfur region.162 
D. Conclusion 
Analogous experiences have contributed to the volatile socio-political 
landscape in Nigeria and Sudan. Thus, they illuminate the nature of conflicts in 
both states. However, the fundamental areas of divergence in these experiences, 
as depicted above, form a crucial background to considering the issue of 
secession in both states. The focus of this Article is not to appraise the legality of 
South Sudan’s secession. Nonetheless, the above background offers a perspective 
to understanding the exigency behind that secession and is key to explaining the 
specific factors taken into account in assessing the legality of secession in 
Nigeria. Specifically, it explains why the precedent of South Sudan’s secession is 
inapplicable to Nigeria and gives color to the factors that are considered below in 
finding that secession cannot be justified in Nigeria. 
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Secession evokes the international law principle of self-determination.163 
Under that principle, an indigenous group forming part of an existing state may 
secede from the state as a matter of right where it is the subject of oppression, 
gross human rights violations, and is denied access to government for self-rule 
within the state.164 This section examines the legal framework for secessionist 
self-determination and applies the principles that become evident to the Nigerian 
 
161. Jacob K. Lupai, Islamic Constitution No Solution to Marginalization and Oppression in Nation, S. 
SUDAN NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/articles/islamic-
constitution-no-solution-to-marginalization-and-oppression-in-nation. 
162. Id. 
163. Karen Parker, Understanding Self-Determination: The Basics, ASS’N FOR HUMANITARIAN LAW. 
(Aug. 2000), http://www.guidetoaction.org/parker/selfdet.html. 
164. CASSESE, supra note 103, at 119-20. 
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case. Specifically, the idea here is to answer the question whether the right to 
secede has vested on any indigenous group in the Nigerian state. 
A.  The Legal Framework of the Principle of Self-Determination 
To put it simply, “the principle of self-determination asserts that it is the right 
of all peoples to freely choose their social, economic, political and cultural future 
without external interference.”165 The principle has its practical roots in the 
American Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Revolution (1789), 
which ended the notion that individuals were properties of the king to deal with 
as he pleased.166 However, the principle was popularized by former U.S. 
President, Woodrow Wilson who, in his thoughts for lasting peace in Europe in 
the early twentieth century, conceptualized self-determination as a corollary of 
popular sovereignty, which generates the right of peoples to freely choose their 
government.167 The principle has evolved considerably since then, assuming 
relatively different meanings in the course of its transformation.168 
Of importance here is the nature of the principle under contemporary 
international law as founded post World War II. The UN Charter proclaims that 
some parts of the UN purposes—to develop friendly relations among nations169 
and to promote international economic and social cooperation170—shall be based 
on respect for self-determination.171 There is no exact definition and scope of the 
principle in any international instrument.172 The result is that even though there 
has been a considerable body of practice based on the principle, its exact scope 
and applicability remains arguable.173 
However, the applicability of the principle of self-determination presupposes 
the existence of a self-determining unit of people linked with territory.174 
Chapters XII and XIII of the UN Charter recognize trust territories as self-
determining units entitled to self-government or independence.175 Similarly, 
 
165. Rudolph C. Ryser, Between Indigenous Nations and the State: Self-determination in the Balance, 2 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 129, 129 (1999). 
166. CASSESE, supra note 103, at 11. 
167. Id. at 13, 19. 
168. Diane F. Orentlicher, International Responses to Separatist Claims: Are Democratic Principles 
Relevant? in SECESSION AND SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 17, at 19, 21 (explaining self-determination’s 
limited effect post-World War I). 
169. U.N. Charter art. I, para. 2. 
170. U.N. Charter art. 55. 
171. CASSESE, supra note 103, at 119-20. 
172. Parker, supra note 163 (explaining the UN Charter and ICJ’s varying definitions). 
173. CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 115. 
174. Id. at 116-17 (noting the principle, as explained by Chapter XI of the UN Charter, applies to 
territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government, territorial disputes, and to only 
defined territories). 
175. U.N. Charter art. 76. 
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Chapter XI acknowledges that non-self-governing territories are entitled to self-
government since it places on member states administering such territories the 
obligation to develop self-government in those territories.176 By subsequent state 
practice expressed through UN General Assembly (“UNGA”) Resolution 1514 
(XV) of 1960, colonies were recognized as non-self-governing and as such 
entitled to a right to self-determination.177 Yet, whether the right continues 
beyond decolonization or alien subjugation to avail indigenous peoples who form 
part of an existing state is still the subject of debates among international law 
scholars.178 
However, it suffices for the analysis relevant here to say that self-
determination has been designated a right by important international 
instruments.179 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”) provide in their common Article 1 (1) that “[a]ll peoples 
have the right of self-determination.180 By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.”181 Similarly, the UN General Assembly Resolution 
2625(XXV) adopted in 1970, titled Declaration of Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Declaration on Friendly 
Relations), declares the right of “all peoples” to self-determination and places a 
duty on states to respect this right in accordance with the UN Charter.182 
Any doubt that may remain that the right to self-determination transcends 
decolonization has been laid to rest at least in the African context.183 This position 
 
176. U.N. Charter art 73. Contained in Chapter XI headed “Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing 
Territories,” requires UN member states administering non-self-governing territories to develop self-
government and to assist them in developing free political institutions. 
177. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 274, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I .C. J. 6, 31 (June 21) aff’d 
in Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I. C. J 12, 31-33 (Oct. 16). 
178. See generally Horowitz, supra note 18. 
179. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, part 1, art. 1, para. 1, 999 
U.N.T.S 171, 173; see International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, part1, art. 1, para.1, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5. 
180. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pt. 1, art. 1, para. 1, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 
U.N.T.S 171; see International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pt. 1, art. 1, para.1, Jan. 3, 
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
181. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pt. 1, art. 1, para. 1, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 
U.N.T.S 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, pt. 1, art. 1, para.1, Jan. 3, 1976, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
182. The Declaration states that “[e]very State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which 
deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their 
right to self-determination and freedom and independence.” G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 
28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at 124 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations]. 
183. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,MULTILATERALTREATY,OAU,,3ae6b3630,0.html. 
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is fortified by the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right (“ACHPR”).184 
Generally remarkable for its unique expansion of human rights, Article 19 of the 
Charter states that “[a]ll peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect 
and shall have the same rights.”185 Nothing shall justify the domination of a 
people by another.”186 In addition, Article 20 puts it beyond doubt that the right to 
self-determination continues to avail “oppressed peoples” post-decolonization.187 
These provisions of the Charter are crucial to an understanding of the right to 
self-determination in Africa.188 Perhaps taking into account the experiences of the 
continent and the continuous dominion of peoples therein at the drafting of the 
ACHPR, the OAU saw it exigent to make explicit that the right to self-
determination exists beyond decolonization.189 While paragraphs 1 and 3 of 
Article 20 refer to “all peoples,” paragraph 3 refers to “colonized or oppressed 
peoples.”190 The latter language makes clear that beyond colonized peoples, the 
right to self-determination avails all “peoples” who are oppressed.191 It is only 
logical that colonization presupposes foreign rule while, peoples may be 
“oppressed” by indigenous governments for which reason they are availed the 
right to self-determination under the said provisions.192 The African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Right confirmed this position in a case brought pursuant 
to Article 20—Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire when it noted that “[a]ll 
peoples have the right to self-determination.”193 
The exercise of the right to self-determination can result “in the 
independence of the self-determining unit as a separate state.”194 In fact, most 
 
184. Id. pt. 1, art. 20. 
185. Id. pt. 1, art. 19. 
186. Id. 
187. Article 20 of the Charter provides:  
(1) All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and 
inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status 
and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have 
freely chosen.  
(2) Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of 
domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community.  
(3) All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the State Parties to the present Charter 
in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or 
cultural. 
Id. pt. 1, art. 20. 
188. See id. 
189. See id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. See generally id. pt. 1, art. 19-20. 
193. Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Comm. No. 75/92 (African Commission for Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 1995) in Eighth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (1994–1995), ACHPR/RPT/8th, Annex VI, para. 3 (1995). 
194. CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 128. 
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secessionist movements base their claims on the right to self-determination.195 
Consequently, the right to secessionist self-determination is subject to 
qualification.196 For as Edward McWhinney observes, “the mere fact of iteration, 
or reiteration, of the principle of self-determination amounts to the beginning of a 
legal problem solving process rather than its conclusion.”197 The Supreme Court 
of Canada summarized the position when it stated in Re Secession of Quebec 
that, “international law expects that the right to self-determination will be 
exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and 
consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states . . . 
Where this is not possible a right of secession may arise.”198 Rightly so, for it is 
common knowledge that the exercise of a legal right is mostly limited at that 
point where it infringes on the right of another.199 Since an exercise of the right to 
self-determination may in some cases result in secession, it sometimes collides 
with the principle of state sovereignty and territorial integrity.200 The latter, which 
finds expression in the maxim, Uti Possidetis, is also protected by international 
law.201 Needless to say, this underscores the “safeguard clauses” for territorial 
integrity contained in virtually all the international instruments already 
discussed.202 
Even within the domestic context, the existence of democracy within a state 
has been used to explain that a unilateral right to secede may undermine majority 
rule—a cardinal principle of democracy.203 “Secession, [i]n this view, is 
legitimate only as a remedy, where particular forms of ‘just cause’ exist—such as 
historic grievances or discriminatory treatment not redressable within the existing 
state . . . .”204 International practices evince the need to find a balance between the 
right to secessionist self-determination and the right of a state to maintain its 
territorial integrity employing an assessment of the available contextual facts.205 
 
195. See Parker, supra note 163 (linking self-determination to the de-colonization process). 
196. See id. (arguing self-determination has been reduced to political rhetoric). 
197. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES AND PLURAL-ETHNIC STATES IN 
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: FAILED STATES, NATION-BUILDING AND THE ALTERNATIVE, FEDERAL 
OPTION 6 (2007). 
198. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 122 (Can.). 
199. See id. 
200. Evan M. Brewer, To Break Free from Tyranny and Oppression: Proposing a Model for a Remedial 
Right to Secession in the Wake of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 245, 248 (2012). 
201. See generally CASSESE, supra note 103, at 190-93. 
202. Brewer, supra note 200, at 248. 
203. Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Federalism and Comparative Transnational Discourse, 2 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 91, 117-18 (2004). 
204. Id. at 118. 
205. Brewer, supra note 200, at 248. 
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The result, therefore, is that secession as an exercise of the right to self-
determination is case-specific.206 
The question that arises at this juncture is—at what point is the self-
determining unit entitled to exercise a right to secede? This question has been the 
subject of a number of international law instruments and opinions—judicial and 
scholarly.207 Article 20(2) of the ACHPR provides that colonized or oppressed 
peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination by 
resorting to any means recognized by the international community.208 The 
Declaration on Friendly Relations, having proclaimed the right to self-
determination, states that: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraph shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in 
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . and thus 
possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to 
the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.209 
The African Commission on Human Rights declared in Katangese Peoples’ 
Congress v Zaire that: 
In the absence of concrete evidence of violations of human rights to the 
point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should be called to question 
and in the absence of evidence that the people of Katanga are denied the 
right to participate in Government . . . the Katanga is obliged to exercise 
a variant of self-determination that is compatible with the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Zaire.210 
  
 
206. Press Release, General Assembly, Most of World’s Population No Longer Lives Under Colonial 
Rule, but United Nations Decolonization Mission Still Unfulfilled, Fourth Committee Told as Debate Begins, 
U.N. Press Release GA/SPD/371 (Oct. 8, 2007). 
207. See G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028, at 124 (Oct. 24, 
1970); see Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Comm. No. 75/92 (African Commission for Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 1995) in Eighth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (1994–1995), ACHPR/RPT/8th, Annex VI (1995); see Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 
S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
208. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, pt. 1, art. 20, para. 2, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,MULTILATERALTREATY,OAU,,3ae6b3630,0.html. 
209. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 182, at pmbl. 
210. Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Comm. No. 75/92 (African Commission for Human and 
Peoples’ Rights 1995) in Eighth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (1994–1995), ACHPR/RPT/8th, Annex VI, para. 6 (1995). 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada opined that:  
the international law right to self-determination only generates, at best, a 
right to external self-determination in situations of former colonies; 
where a people is oppressed as for example under foreign military 
occupation; or where a definable group is denied meaningful access to 
government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural 
development.211  
The Court then found that such circumstances had not arisen in Quebec.212 
The principle that can be deciphered from the above statements of 
international law is that for a people to be entitled to a right to secessionist self-
determination, a threshold standard must be reached.213 In other words, there must 
be just cause.214 On this score, Antonio Cassese, having found that the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations implicitly authorized secession, suggested that 
the following conditions existing cumulatively might give rise to the right to 
secede: when the central authorities of a sovereign state (1) persistently refuse to 
grant participatory rights to a group; (2) grossly and systematically trample on 
their fundamental human rights; and (3) deny the possibility of reaching peaceful 
settlement within the frame work of the state structure.215 
B. Has the Right to Secessionist Self-Determination Vested on Any Indigenous 
Group in Nigeria? 
The major process through which most Nigerians have envisaged the 
reinvention of the Nigerian political framework is the convening of a “Sovereign 
National Conference” (“SNC”).216 Although the calls for an SNC gathered 
renewed momentum with South Sudan’s independence, agitations for an SNC are 
not novel to the extant Nigerian democracy. The issue emerged in the Nigerian 
socio-polity in the early 2000s.217 Those advocating for an SNC are some elites of 
specific ethnic groups—Yoruba, Igbo, and other minority groups in the Niger-
 
211. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 137 (Can.). 
212. Id. 
213. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 182, at 124; see Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. 
Zaire, Comm. No. 75/92 (African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights 1995) in Eighth Annual Activity 
Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1994–1995), ACHPR/RPT/8th, Annex VI, 
(1995); see Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
214. Jackson, supra note 203, at 118. 
215. CASSESE, supra note 103, at 119-20. 
216. Understanding the Sovereign National Conference (SNC), OPEN MIND FOUND., http://www. 
openmindfoundation.com/index.php/understanding-the-sovereign-national-conference-snc/ (last visited Feb. 20, 
2013). 
217. Suberu, supra note 158, at 149-50 (explaining Nigeria’s history as a country of widely different 
peoples and tribes, as well as the amalgamation of North and South Sudan). 
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Delta region of Southern Nigeria.218 These elites suggest that the SNC will 
provide an occasion to evaluate the desirability of the Nigerian political union.219 
Consequently, the federal government of Nigeria views the idea of an SNC with 
suspicion, and this constitutes one of the reasons it continues to resist convening 
the same.220 This suspicion is, perhaps, not unconnected with the fact that the 
elites who advocate for an SNC incidentally belong to the indigenous groups that 
have evinced the greatest dissatisfaction with the Nigerian state.221 Specifically, 
among the Yoruba, the minorities of the Niger-Delta, and the Igbo, there have 
been the emergence of armed militias who confront the state based on their 
politico-economic dissatisfactions.222 It is no accident, perhaps, that the groups 
who see an SNC as unnecessary are from the northern parts of Nigeria—the only 
part of Nigeria that has no trace of crude oil.223 The Movement for the 
Actualization of a Sovereign State of Biafra (“MASSOB”), a movement with 
membership of some Nigerians of Igbo origin, seeks secession.224 From this 
analogy, although it may not have been expressly articulated, the potential 
secessionist groups in the Nigerian state are the Yoruba, Igbo, and the minority 
groups in the South-South region—all of the southern part of Nigeria.225 
1. The Peoples and Territories of Nigeria 
As already said, whether a right to secede arises is one of assessment,226 and 
that assessment proceeds from the notion that there exists a self-determining unit 
of people linked with territory.227 Perhaps, this is because the collective and 
remedial nature of the right presupposes the existence of a “people” who can lay 
claim to a territory over which they can exercise sovereignty.228 As Hurst 
 
218. Id. at 150. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 148. 
222. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°119, supra note 51, at 1. 
223. See generally id. (explaining the absence of secession talks in Northern Nigeria because of the oil 
resource). 
224. Id. 
225. See id. 
226. Press Release, General Assembly, Most of World’s Population No Longer Lives Under Colonial 
Rule, but United Nations Decolonization Mission Still Unfulfilled, Fourth Committee Told as Debate Begins, 
U.N. Press Release GA/SPD/371 (Oct. 8, 2007). 
227. CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 116-17; U.N. Charter art. 73, 76; Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 274, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I .C. J. 6, 31 (June 21) aff’d in Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 
1975 I. C. J 12, 31-33 (Oct. 16). 
228. See CRAWFORD, supra note 16, at 116-17; U.N. Charter art. 73, 76; Legal Consequences for States of 
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 274, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I .C. J. 6, 31 (June 21) aff’d in Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 
1975 I. C. J 12, 31-33 (Oct. 16). 
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Hannum suggests, implicit in the idea of self-determination is the subjective and 
objective elements.229 While the subjective identifies the group’s belief of 
distinctness, the objective element identifies the outward marks of that 
distinctness.230 International instruments have avoided defining “people” for the 
purpose of self-determination, and there has also been no judicial opinion finding 
a universal meaning for the term.231 Yet, the Supreme Court of Canada in Re 
Secession of Quebec offered an insight to what may constitute “people” for the 
purpose of self-determination when it took the view that “people” may include 
only a portion of the population of a state and that to hold that “people” means 
the entire population of a state would be duplicative since the relevant 
instruments which proclaim the right also emphasize the need to protect the 
territorial integrity of states.232 
The mere fact that the groups contemplated here and, indeed, those that make 
up Nigeria today existed politically in some form of statehood before colonial 
amalgamations shows their peoplehood and historical claim to territory that it 
appears almost superfluous to attempt any further illustrations.233 Like Sudan, the 
ethnic groups that comprise today’s Nigeria are not only distinct by a relatively 
diverse culture and language, they are also geographically separated.234 Much so 
that one time British Governor-General of Nigeria, Hugh Clifford, described the 
peoples of Nigeria as a “collection of self contained and mutually independent 
Native States, separated from one another . . . by vast distances, by differences of 
history and traditions, and by ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social and 
religious barriers.”235 
Historians trace the earliest evidence of human existence in Nigeria to around 
9000 BCE in the western region.236 By 1500, the groups that constitute modern 
Nigeria had moved significantly from a decentralized political setting to 
centralized states in the form of kingdoms and emirates.237 Among these states 
were Ile-Ife (Ife) to the west of Nigeria; Benin in the Niger-Delta area; kanem-
Bornu to the northeast; and smaller Hausa states scattered around the north-
central savannah.238 The Igbo and other ethnic groups that constitute the former 
eastern region of Nigeria have occupied their territories for well over 3,000 
 
229. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 30 (1990). 
230. See id. 
231. Javier Leon Diaz, Minority Rights: Status and Scope JAVIER LEON DIAZ (2002), http://www.javier-
leon-diaz.com/docs/Minority_Status1.htm. 
232. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 124 (Can.). 
233. FALOLA, supra note 97, at 18-19. 
234. M.G. Kaladharan Nayar, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Context; Biafra in Retrospect, 10 
TEX. INT’L L. J. 321, 324 (quoting Hugh Clifford in F. SCHWARZ, NIGERIA: THE TRIBES, THE NATION, OR THE 
RACE—THE POLITICS OF INDEPENDENCE 3 (1965)). 
235. Id. 
236. FALOLA, supra note 97, at 18. 
237. Id. at 22-24; see also FED. RESEARCH DIV., supra note 76, at 6-7. 
238. FALOLA, supra note 97, at 22-24. 
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years.239 The Igbo, Yoruba, and the other minority groups in the Niger-Delta 
region are distinct in language, culture, history, and ancestral beliefs.240 In 
addition, they are conscious of their identity and their distinctness from other 
groups in the Nigerian state.241 Their territorial concentrations have also not been 
affected by immigrations or emigrations. Today, in discussions among Nigerians, 
it is still very common to describe the territories of these groups by reference to 
their ethnic presence, Igbo-land, Yoruba-land, Benin-land, and so on.242 Having 
found that the groups that can potentially be associated to secessionism in 
Nigeria constitute units of self-determination,243 the task is to determine whether 
the right to secede has vested on any of them. 
2. Participation in Government and Marginalization 
According to the last resort theory of secession, the right to secessionist self-
determination may only accrue when a people are not allowed to achieve self-
determination internally—within the existing state by access to government.244 
Nigeria is a federal republic of thirty-six states and 774 local governments.245 The 
Yoruba occupy six states to the West. The Igbos have five states to the East 
while, six states of the South-South region are home to different minority 
groups.246 Thus, the sub-federal units are ethnically mixed for the minority groups 
and homogenous for the majority groups.247 
Nigeria practices a variant of the U.S. democratic presidential system.248 At 
the center, the president is at the apex of the executive hierarchy, and the 
legislature is bicameral, divided into the Senate and the House of 
Representatives.249 Each of the thirty-six states has three Senators while, in the 
case of House of Representatives members, the entire country is divided into 360 
constituencies with each constituency producing a House of Representative 
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member.250 Therefore, the Yoruba, Igbo, and the groups in the South-South region 
are represented in the national legislature.251 
Each sub-state in the union has a governor wielding the highest executive 
powers in that state.252 The legislative powers of states are exercised by the House 
of Assembly of each state that is constituted by a delegate from each state 
constituency.253 The state constituencies are mapped out from the states in such a 
way that each state has in its House of Assembly three or four times the number 
of representatives it has in the Federal House of Representatives.254 The number 
of House of Assembly members for each state is a minimum of twenty-four and a 
maximum of forty.255 Consequently, all groups in Nigeria including the Yoruba, 
Igbo, and the minorities of the South-South also have sub-national self-
government.256 
Moreover, the federal character policy for ethno-religious balancing has 
ensured that in all post-colonial republics in Nigeria, candidates for the major 
political offices have emerged from different ethnic groups or regions such that at 
no time in a civilian dispensation have the principal offices been occupied by 
persons from the same ethnic origin.257 Accordingly, political parties employ an 
informal “zoning” formula in which case they rotate the presidential candidacy 
between the North and South and other elective offices among the ethnic 
groups.258 There has been a president of Yoruba origin in Nigeria.259 The Igbo has 
produced a Vice President,260 and on more than one occasion has produced the 
Senate President,261 the most senior national legislator and the third highest 
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national office in Nigeria.262 The current President of Nigeria is from the South-
South region of Nigeria.263 Members of the Judiciary are appointed by the 
President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council.264 The 
Yoruba, Igbo, and the groups in the South-South have all produced high-ranking 
members of the national judiciary. Members of these groups continue to run for 
different elective offices in line with their aspirations under the platform of 
various political parties in Nigeria. It becomes pertinent to note for this purpose 
that the Supreme Court of Canada, in finding that the right to secede has not 
vested in Quebec,265 noted the fact that its people occupied prominent positions in 
the government of Canada and that they were equitably represented in the 
executive, legislature, and judiciary.266 
Post-colonial military rule usurped the political space for political 
participation and representative government.267 Sporadic coup plots in the post-
independence polity caused fear and distrust among military officers who were 
vicious for power.268 This, in turn, caused high-ranking military officers to cling 
to ethnic and religious affiliations for trust and safety. The result was the 
emergence of a northern military oligarchy.269 Thus, while the four military 
governments of 1966-79 were headed by a southern Igbo Christian, northern 
minority Christian, northern Hausa-Fulani Muslim, and southern Yoruba 
Christian, respectively, the four military governments of 1984-99 were headed by 
northern Muslims only.270 The return to multiparty democracy in 1999 has 
provided the space for political evolutions of the groups.271 It is then instructive to 
note that the right to self-determination, in its internal sense as founded under 
contemporary international law, admits various forms of self-government 
(including regional self-government, autonomy, and so on) organized within an 
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existing state.272 It is only when this becomes impracticable that secession 
becomes an option.273 
3. Oppression and Gross Human Rights Violations 
Due to military incursions into the post-independence political era in both 
Nigeria and Sudan, dictatorship and its attendant relegation of the rule of law 
characterizes a better part of post-independence governance in these states. 
However, while Nigeria transitioned to civilian democracy in 1999,274 Sudan 
experienced a continuation of military rule when President al-Bashir, a military 
dictator, declared himself President of Sudan in 1993.275 These events have had 
their respective effects on the socio-political landscapes that unfolded in both 
states. It is instructive to recall at this juncture that implicit in Cassese’s 
suggestions of factors that may give rise to a right to secede, is the fact that the 
human rights violations by the central government should target the self-
determining group.276 While Nigeria and Sudan experience human rights 
violations, the extent, pattern, and nature are significantly different. Human rights 
violations and oppression in Sudan were grievous, systemic, and discriminatory, 
with the government unconscionably targeting specific groups. As discussed 
below, however, human rights violations in Nigeria assume a dimension that 
differs from the Sudanese experience. 
Generally, two developments provide a spectacle for considering oppression 
and human rights violations in Sudan—southern resistance to Islamization and 
the subsequent Darfur crisis.277 However, only the former is relevant to the 
analysis intended here since it is directly linked to the independence of South 
Sudan. The recurrent issue of the state-backed Islamization policy polarized the 
peoples of Sudan into the Muslim and non-Muslim groups.278 The approach of the 
Sudanese government to this issue, which in itself was a consequence of the 
government’s impunity for basic human freedoms, was repressive and 
arbitrary.279 The result was gross human rights violations and oppression.280 The 
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ensuing conflict culminated in the declaration of Jihad (Holy War) by the current 
Sudanese government on the peoples of Southern Sudan who formed the bulk of 
the non-Muslim group.281 This removed any ambiguity that may have remained as 
to the government’s perception and approach to the war. Consequently, in May 
1996 Human Rights Watch reported that “[t]he [Sudanese] government’s 
approach to the war [was] divisive: its aim appear[ed] to be a military victory in 
which the dominant Islamic and Arabic culture is imposed on militarily defeated 
non-Islamic and non-Arabic speaking southern and other peoples.”282 This 
division set the stage for greater human rights violations that accompanied oil 
exploration that commenced in Sudan in 1999.283 The existing reproach made the 
government perceive the southern peoples as a threat to oil exploration in the 
South.284 As a result, it employed brute force to displace the centuries-long 
residents of the oilfields, the Nuer, Dinka, and other Southern Sudanese 
population, destroying civilian lives and property to provide security for the 
foreign oil explorers.285 Its tactics included indiscriminate aerial bombardment, 
the use of famine and the use of armed militias, among others.286 Consequently, in 
2002, Sudan was the first and only state in the genocide watch list of the 
Holocaust Museum’s Committee of Conscience based in Washington, D.C.287 
Upon the signing of the CPA, Khartoum continued to target southerners residing 
in the North for persecution and marginalization.288 
It should be noted that although the ICCPR allows for a state to derogate 
from its obligations under the Covenant in public emergencies posing a threat to 
the life of the nation, it excludes a number of rights from those a state can so 
derogate.289 These include the right to life and freedom from torture, inhumane, or 
degrading treatment.290 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Right 
confirmed this position when it noted that the occasion of war did not justify 
Chad Republic to derogate from its ACHPR obligations.291 Sudan is a signatory to 
the ACHPR.292 
 
281. Section 12 (1) of The Constitutional Decree No. 13 provides that Jihad is the duty of the National 
Armed Forces (Sudan’s Army). See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 29, at 24-25. 
282. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BEHIND THE RED LINE: POLITICAL REPRESSION IN SUDAN (1996), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Sudan.htm. 
283. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SUDAN, OIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 277, at 36. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°39, supra note 28, at 4. 
287. Id. 
288. Amnesty Int’l, Human Rights Violations Surrounding the South Sudan Referendum, AI Index AFR 
64/002/2011 (Jan. 11, 2011), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/002/2011/ 
en/866b3a87-50e5-4431-9748-f0b6356e542b/afr540022011en.pdf. 
289. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S 171. 
290. Id. art. 4(2), 7. 
291. Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés/Chad, Comm. No. 74/92 (African 
Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights 1995) in Eighth Ordinary Session of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (1994-1995), para. 21 (1995), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ 
[2] OBEHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2013 11:16 AM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 26 
449 
In Nigeria, the transition to civil rule in 1999 was greeted with much 
expectation and hope.293 Unfortunately, successive civilian governments have not 
met these expectations.294 The entire Chapter IV of the Nigerian Constitution is 
devoted to the provision of civil and political rights,295 while Chapter II 
(Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy) is replete with 
elaborate provisions on socio-economic rights.296 The latter are, however, non-
justiciable and remain mere state aspirations.297 Nevertheless, human rights 
violations continue unabated in Nigeria. There appears to be unanimity among 
international human rights groups on the nature and extent of the major human 
rights issues that inhibit the democratic process in Nigeria.298 These violations can 
be subsumed under two major issues—police brutality and the government’s 
failure to adequately redress human rights violations.299 
Nigeria currently has a central police force where all police officers in the 
country serve irrespective of ethno-religious group origin or membership.300 
Before colonialism, the groups that now comprise Nigeria used youth groups for 
policing and law enforcement.301 A formal and regimented police force was 
established with the advent of colonial rule.302 The practice of colonial 
administrators was to draft police officers to areas far from their ethnic origins to 
bridge the deep ethnic loyalty they thought could be counterproductive to their 
exploitative ends.303 Thus, from its colonial inception the nature of the Nigerian 
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Police was antagonistic and confrontational.304 Today, police violations in Nigeria 
include torture, extortion, arbitrary arrest, excessive periods of pre-trial detention, 
and extra-judicial executions.305 Other security agencies do not fare better. 
Corruption in government and in the bureaucratic hierarchy of the police force, 
underfunding due to long years of neglect resulting in lack of resources, 
inadequate laws, inadequate police training, and increase in crime rate due to 
unemployment306 provide new reasons for the poor human rights records of the 
Nigerian Police.307 However, these human rights violations do not target any 
group for oppression.308 A 2005 study by Human Rights Watch is of particular 
relevance on this score since it covered major cities in the North, East, and West 
of Nigeria being homes to different ethno-religious groups: Kano, Enugu, and 
Lagos respectively.309 The incidents and nature of human rights violations by the 
police were basically the same in all the locations, and in respect of those 
targeted the report had this to say: “[o]rdinary criminal suspects who have been 
detained and accused of crimes ranging from petty theft to armed robbery and 
murder are those most vulnerable to torture and death in custody.”310 
Equally worrisome is the failure of successive Nigerian Governments to 
adequately redress incidents of gross human rights violations.311 Most large-scale 
human rights violations since 1999 have been the result of inter-group violence 
and killings.312 Violent conflicts have erupted causing massive fatalities in Plateau 
State, a sub-state in Nigeria, between “settlers” and aborigines of the state with 
respect to socio-political benefits.313 The same state continues to be the center of 
inter-communal clashes resulting in massive civilian fatalities.314 Political 
opportunism among politicians who mobilize or whip up ethnic and/or religious 
sentiments for their political gains, create acrimony among political parties, 
politicians, and their loyalists, resulting in inter-group violence.315 For instance, 
the national elections of 2011 polarized the country along ethno-religious lines 
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and a conflagration ensued when groups in the north of Nigeria started a protest 
against the loss of a northern candidate at the presidential elections to a candidate 
of southern origin.316 About 800 people that cut across all groups were reported 
dead.317 “Federal and state authorities fail to break the cycle of violence by failing 
to hold the perpetrators of these crimes accountable.”318 This failure on the part of 
the government extends to extra-judicial killings by security forces in a bid to 
quell violent inter-communal clashes.319 Recommendations or reports of 
committees set up by federal and state governments to investigate incidents of 
inter-group violence yield little or no result since neither prosecution of suspects 
nor compensation of victims are the outcome of such investigations.320 
Corruption, political nepotism, the underlying culture of impunity caused by long 
years of military rule and an over-burdened judiciary  account for the failure of 
government and its agencies to adequately act in the best regards of human 
rights,321 rather than the desire to oppress or subjugate particular groups. 
The cycle extends to the violent campaign of Boko Haram.322 The sect, 
beginning with the meaning of its name—“western education is a sin”—has 
waged a war on everything that signifies western civilization, the Nigerian state, 
and all who stand on the way of its fundamentalism.323 Therefore, it is a group of 
insurgents, and its war is against the state.324 This is evident from its attack on the 
UN building and the Police Headquarters, both in the state’s capital, Abuja. 
According to Human Rights Watch, “[s]uspected Boko Haram members, often 
riding motorcycles and carrying Kalashnikov rifles under their robes, have 
gunned down numerous Christian worshipers, police officers, and soldiers, and 
assassinated local politicians, community leaders, and Islamic clerics who oppose 
the group.”325 
C. Conclusions on Secession in Nigeria 
It should be recalled once more that Cassese’s suggestions as given above 
include factors that should exist cumulatively.326 Therefore, the self-determining 
group having been identified must also be such that the group is not allowed 
representation or access to government and must be the subject of oppression and 
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gross human rights violations by the central government.327 There are peoples 
linked with territories (self-determining units) in Nigeria including the Yoruba, 
Igbo, and the groups in the South-South.328 However, the assessment above shows 
that the right to secede has not vested in any of these groups since none of them 
can claim to be under attack or the subject of oppression or persecution by the 
state as was the case in Sudan. Even more is the fact that all these groups have a 
form of self-government and continue to be represented in government at all 
levels.329 
Finding that secession cannot be legally justified in Nigeria and that inter-
group violent conflict continues to destabilize the Nigerian socio-polity fifty-two 
years post-independence supports the truth that a reconsideration of Nigeria’s 
internal political system is apposite and crucial to inter-group accommodation 
and coexistence. It is to this that I now turn. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM AS A MECHANISM FOR CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 
A. Contextualizing the Problem of Inter-Group Conflict in Nigeria 
Inter-group conflict, as already evident, is not only a bane of socio-political 
problems in Nigeria, it has assumed a dimension that threatens the country’s 
unity.330 This problem can be explained in light of the consistent patterns its direct 
causes have exhibited over time.331 Inter-group conflicts have erupted from what 
is generally referred to in Nigeria as the “national question.”332 Closely related to 
the issue of “national question” is a clash of identities, cultures, and aspirations. 
Differences in groups’ cultures and aspirations or priorities, which were hitherto 
suppressed by the guns of the military era, are gaining increased salience with the 
return to democracy in 1999.333 The Shari’a issue is bi-dimensional since it 
reflects both the problem of “national question” and a clash of groups’ 
aspirations in Nigeria.334 For instance, debates about the role Shari’a should play 
in the Nigerian state continue to generate tensions between Muslims and 
Christians, on the one hand, and among Muslim sects in Nigeria, on the other 
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hand.335 In the year 2000, the expansion of Shari’a from personal law into the 
penal system of some states in the northern parts of Nigeria resulted in violent 
Christian-Muslim conflict in Kano and Kaduna states, which left thousands of 
people dead.336 
Violent inter-group conflicts have also been the result of unhealthy political 
competitions and rivalries among groups in Nigeria, especially with regards to 
who controls the center.337 Consequently, national elections remain bitterly 
contested and highly volatile.338 For instance, the aftermath of the national 
presidential elections in 2011 was a conflagration that pitched some northern 
groups against some southern groups due to protests by the northern groups that a 
candidate from the north lost at the presidential election.339 The issue of national 
census also continues to spark tensions. Since socio-political benefits are tied to 
population, groups perceive the census figures as yet another mechanism for 
certain groups to secure socio-political dominance and undue economic 
benefits.340 Consequently, the latent problems underlying inter-group conflicts in 
Nigeria can be unbundled to include: the “national question;” a clash in groups’ 
identities and aspirations; and inter-group rivalry and competition. 
B. Constitutional Federalism 
Experts of federalism concede that, as with most legal or social concepts, 
federalism has different definitions.341 However, Peter Schuck defines federalism 
as “a system that divides political authority between a nation-state and sub-
national polities within its territory so that both the national and sub-national 
polities directly govern individuals within their jurisdiction, and that confers both 
national and sub-national citizenship.”342 Implicit in the foregoing, and indeed in 
virtually all definitions of federalism, is that a federal structure must involve a 
distribution of powers between at least two levels of government.343 To that 
extent, Nigeria is a federal republic and currently has the longest surviving 
federal system in Africa where the predominant tendency is to regard federalism 
as synonymous to disunity or disintegration.344 It is a preponderant notion among 
 
335. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°168, supra note 48, at 11-15 (2010). 
336. Id. at 13. 
337. See Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800, supra note 312. 
338. Id. 
339. Id. 
340. ROTIMI T. SUBERU, FEDERALISM AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN NIGERIA 13-14 (2001). 
341. Polycarp Onwubiko, National Security: Can Nigeria Have a Different Definition of Federalism?, 
VANGUARD (Jan. 27, 2013), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/national-security-can-nigeria-have-a-
different-definition-of-federalism/; see Peter H. Schuck, Federalism, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 5, 5 (2006). 
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legal and social science scholars that federalism is one system apposite for multi-
cultural states.345 Since the theoretical emphasis is always on context rather than 
form,346 the system possesses the attribute of flexibility, which ensures its 
adaptability to intricate political dispensations that may be relevant to inter-group 
conflict mitigation.347 
There is no doubt that the adoption of federalism in Nigeria has, to an extent, 
contained ethno-religious fragmentation, conflict and other socio-political 
problems.348 Specifically, that Nigeria has not experienced another full-fledged 
war since 1970 is, to a large extent, attributable to its federal practice.349 Multi-
state federalism in Nigeria has, on the one hand, provided the diverse ethnic 
peoples an avenue for self-determination through self-government, and on the 
other hand, it has addressed the issue of disparity, which disturbs many federal 
systems including the Nigerian federalism of the first republic (1960-66).350 With 
the emergence of democracy, ethnic groups, especially those in the minority, 
have access to government. Similarly, there has been a more robust site for group 
deliberations, which has helped to create a common front against dictatorial 
tendencies.351 For instance, it was the political process and especially the public 
outrage of all groups at public and private forums that forestalled the inordinate 
ambition of President Obasanjo to remain as president beyond his 
constitutionally guaranteed term in the periods leading to the 2007 elections.352 
What is more, the political scientist, Rotimi Suberu has identified that it was 
the Nigerian federal structure that helped defuse what he called the “Shari’a 
bomb.”353 He explained that the federal system ensured that the implementation 
of the law in some northern states recently did not develop into a foisting of 
Islamic theocracy on the entire country.354 Unfortunately, however, post-1999 
events in Nigeria show that the Nigerian federalism falls short of addressing 
group fragmentation and the issues that underlie inter-group conflict in the 
country.  
 
345. Schuck, supra note 341, at 8. 
346. Lovise Aalen, Ethnic Federalism and Self-Determination for Nationalities in a Semi-Authoritarian 
State: The Case of Ethiopia, 13 INT’L J. MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 243, 244 (2006). 
347. Id. 
348. Andrew F. Clark, The Crisis of Nigerian Federalism, H-NET (Mar. 2003), http://www.h-
net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=7324. 
349. See generally INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°113, supra note 10; Clark, supra note 348. 
350. Clark, supra note 348. 
351. INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT N°113, supra note 10, at 16. 
352. Id. 
353. Suberu, supra note 158, at 145. 
354. Id. 
[2] OBEHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2013 11:16 AM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 26 
455 
C. Theories for Constitutional Engineering in Divided Societies 
There are a plethora of theories for constitutional engineering for divided 
societies.355 However, these theories are variations of two broad schools of 
thought—namely, consociation and integration.356 Leading these schools of 
thought are two renowned scholars—Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz, 
respectively.357 Both scholars developed their theories from democracy. 
Consociational democracy is expressed by the presence of four strategic 
principles: grand coalition, segmented autonomy, mutual veto, and proportional 
representation (“PR”).358 According to Lijphart, coalition and autonomy are 
complementary and form the basic characteristics of consociation.359 Coalition, 
also called power-sharing, refers to the partnership (or cooperation) among 
leaders of the different groups in the national government which should deal with 
issues of common concern.360 Segmented autonomy requires that the groups be 
segmented and bestowed with the decision-making capacity such that different 
groups decide on internal matters concerning them.361 The mutual veto is a 
guarantee against dominance in the national decision-making process.362 By 
virtue of majority rule—a principle of democracy—minorities may not be able to 
impact state decisions.363 An arrangement for mutual veto will ensure minorities’ 
congruence to major decisions affecting them.364 PR should then be the basic 
standard for political formations and representations in the national 
bureaucracy.365 
Consociation rejects leaving the polity to the dictates of majority rule, but 
finds that the groups should be autonomous and treated equally at the center 
where they are represented based on proportionality.366 Lijphart emphasizes his 
preference for the parliamentary system of government and its collegial decision-
making cabinet over the one-man presidential system, which utilizes a mere 
advisory cabinet.367 The idea is that the collegial decision-making executive in the 
 
355. See Arend Lijphart, Consociation and Federalism: Conceptual and Empirical Links, 12 CAN. J. POL. 
SCI. 499, 500 (1979); see HOROWITZ, supra note 11, at 613-17. 
356. See Lijphart, supra note 355, at 500; see HOROWITZ, supra note 11, at 613-17. 
357. See Lijphart, supra note 355, at 500; see HOROWITZ, supra note 11, at 613-17. 
358. Lijphart, supra note 355, at 500. 
359. Id. 
360. Eghosa E. Osaghae, Managing Multiple Minority Problems in a Divided Society: the Nigerian 
Experience, 36 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 1 (1998), available at http://intractableconflict.org/vky/!hb-
readings/multiple-minorities.pdf. 
361. Lijphart, supra note 355, at 500. 




366. Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 96, 100 (2004). 
367. Id. at 101. 
[2] OBEHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2013 11:16 AM 
2013 / Between Secession and Federalism 
456 
parliamentary system is crucial to the formation of effective coalitions by the 
groups, or where the groups are not easily identifiable, by the political parties.368 
Lijphart contemplates that autonomy may be achieved through federalism, where 
the groups are geographically separated, or decentralization of powers, where the 
groups are geographically mixed.369 To this end, he notes that the federal structure 
should comprise relatively small component units to guarantee homogeneity, and 
powers should be generously decentralized.370 
On the other hand is the Horowitz integration model, which conceives of a 
state where the groups are allowed to freely integrate at the national level while 
regulating the actions of politicians to ensure that they act towards ethnic 
accommodation.371 Both theories recognize, however, that there should be some 
form of decentralization of powers to the component groups.372 But while 
consociation envisages homogenous sub-states,373 the integration model holds 
further that where homogenous states cannot be achieved because groups are 
geographically mixed, heterogeneous states should be created if the purpose is to 
reduce tension at the center.374 
Nevertheless, Horowitz finds some assumptions of consociation problematic 
in practical terms.375 To Lijphart’s suggestion that cooperation among political 
leaders in European states has produced stability in spite of heterogeneity, he 
contends that diversity in Europe is not as extensive as the ascriptive group 
divisions in Africa or Asia.376 He argues that the reliance on cooperation among 
group leaders for coalitions is problematic because deeply-divided societies 
rarely consist of groups having allegiance to any specific leadership,377 and in any 
case, the assumption that such leaders will always act in the best interest of 
ethnic accommodation is unsafe.378 Alternatively, he contends that politicians can 
only be sure to act towards conflict prevention if the structures so induce them.379 
For such an inducing structure, he focuses on the electoral system.380 According 
to him, electoral mechanisms that provide incentives for groups to work together 
(integrate) will produce moderate representatives beneficial to all.381 Lijphart 
counters that this proposition will lead to majority rule—domination of 
 
368. Id. at 103. 
369. Id. at 104-05. 
370. Id. at 105. 
371. HOROWITZ, supra note 11, at 613-17. 
372. Id. at 617. 
373. Id; see also Lijphart, supra note 366, at 105. 
374. HOROWITZ, supra note 11, at 613-17. 
375. Id. at 570-71. 
376. Id. at 571-72. 
377. Id. at 573. 
378. Id. at 564. 
379. Id. at 573. 
380. Id.  
381. Id. at 184-96. 
[2] OBEHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2013 11:16 AM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 26 
457 
minorities who will rise up in their own defense with time.382 Integration prefers a 
presidential system of government since it allows for “one man” and not “one 
ethnic group” (where political parties are ethnically derived) to control executive 
powers.383 
D. The Nigerian Constitutional Model of Integration 
Nigeria operates an integration model of constitutional federalism.384 It 
embraced, at least constitutionally, the system in 1979 when it adopted a variant 
of the U.S. model of presidential federalism.385 In consonance with Horowitz’s 
postulations, Nigeria currently has thirty-six homogenous and heterogeneous 
sub-states. This is due to group mixture in some parts of the country and 
homogenous concentration in other parts. The president is both the head of state 
and government. He appoints an advisory cabinet. Consequently, there is no 
place for coalition governments in the executive—a fundamental requirement of 
consociation.386 Rather, in unison with Horowitz’s theory of electoral regulation, 
the constitution adopts two mechanisms to ensure cooperation among political 
leaders; namely, that the president must have at least one-quarter of the total 
votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the states in the 
federation and the federal capital territory.387 Second, for a political party to be 
registered, it is required that its membership be open to all citizens irrespective of 
place of origin and that its name, symbol, or logo does not contain any ethnic or 
religious connotation giving an impression that its activities are limited to any 
particular part of the country.388 The purpose of this, according to Horowitz, is to 
provide incentives for politicians to integrate on a cross-ethnic basis and thus 
imbibe inter-ethnic accommodation and approach to politics, which in turn will 
ultimately produce moderate representatives.389 
It is significant that in the 2003 general elections in Nigeria, the People’s 
Democratic Party (“PDP”) won thirty-two of the thirty-six State Houses of 
Assembly and sixty-two percent of the total presidential votes for its southern 
Christian candidate, General Olusegun Obasanjo (retired).390 While this gives an 
indication of effective integration, it is equally significant that the All Nigerians 
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Peoples’ Party (“ANPP”) led by a northern Muslim, General Muhammadu 
Buhari (retired) won all seven of the State Houses of Assembly elections in the 
conservative Muslim states of the North.391 This has been interpreted as, perhaps, 
reinforcing ethno-regionalism.392 The question then is why has the attempt at 
integration not effectively managed diversity or secured ethnic accommodation 
in Nigeria? Many observers agree that the answers to this question lie in the 
history of the Nigerian presidential federalism. 
E. Origins of the Nigerian Federalism 
Nigeria inherited its federalism from British colonial rule after consultations 
with Nigerians at the time indicated a preference for regional autonomy and 
political space.393 Consequently, the four Constitutions that prescribed political 
arrangements—from 1946 to the first military coup in 1966—concentrated 
powers into the three regions in which the country was divided.394 The system of 
government was parliamentary as a result of colonial legacy.395 The three 
regions—East, West, and North that made up the federal system at this time were 
territorially delimited along the lines of the three major ethnic groups—the Igbo, 
Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani respectively.396 Since the three political parties in the 
country at the time were also ethnic-based, the center became a battle-field for 
ethnic competition and rivalry.397 The northern region dominated the national 
government through its numerical strength.398 In fact, that region was almost 
twice the size of the other two regions put together.399 
The result was that issues like national census and elections became 
problematic and incited chaos as the western and eastern regions felt cheated by 
the northern dominance and what seemed to be its hegemony.400 With the 
agitations of minority groups for political space, the political tension deteriorated 
rapidly, having its repercussions on virtually every sphere of the country’s 
national and sub-national life.401 This was one of the major reasons for the first 
military intervention in Nigerian politics through the January 15, 1966 coup.402 
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tension.403 However, the subsequent military government that came to power after 
the July 29, 1966 coup reverted to federalism and, in a failed bid to avert the civil 
war, divided the three regions into twelve states in 1967.404 The aftermath of the 
war, which was basically a struggle for secession, inculcated a precautionary 
consciousness in the military regimes that followed and there was a deliberate 
and systematic effort to concentrate powers at the center.405 Nigeria, thus, became 
a federation in form, but unitary in terms of the vertical distribution of powers.406 
Consequently, unlike the coming together of sovereignties as with the U.S. model 
of federalism, the Nigerian federalism was historically non-aggregative being one 
where powers were devolved to the sub-national units from a hitherto unitary 
structure.407 In other words, the sub-states have always had such powers that the 
national government felt comfortable to devolve. 
F. The Need to Reconsider the Nigerian Federal System 
The idea here is not to identify the numerous problems that confront Nigeria. 
Rather, it is to identify some basic issues in the Nigerian federal system that have 
circumvented its efficiency in the management of group fragmentation and 
specifically the root causes of inter-group conflicts in the country. 
1. Distribution of Powers 
Horowitz himself notes that where there are sub-ethnic cleavages in 
homogenous sub-states, devolution of a “generous” share of powers will likely 
reduce conflict at the center.408 Festus Nze and Paul King similarly find that a 
cardinal principle of federal arrangements is that powers “should be so weighted 
as to maintain a fair balance between the national and regional governments.”409 
They, however, conclude that Nigeria has over time breached this principle, and, 
as such, it is run as a unitary state masqueraded as federal.410 By section 4(2) of 
the Nigerian Constitution, the national government has exclusive powers over 
any of the items contained in the Exclusive legislative list and a concurrent 
jurisdiction with sub-states over items in the Concurrent List where its laws 
prevail in cases of inconsistencies.411 Concentration of powers in the national 
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government as a means to foster national integration has been noted as one of the 
major causes of militant ethnic nationalism, conflict and political disorder in sub-
Sahara Africa.412 In Nigeria, it minimizes the depth of group loyalty and affinity 
in the country. 
“Asymmetrical federalism in general makes special dispensations possible, 
but more possible at the periphery than near the center . . . .”413 Post-colonial 
experience in Nigeria shows that the national government cannot represent a 
coalescence of the diverse, and often conflicting, aspirations of the different 
ethno-religious groups. Rather, centralization has caused groups to imbibe the 
feeling that only the national government can placate their plight, and so they 
direct their agitations as such bypassing the sub-state authorities. The result is 
that most ethnic and religious tensions transcend the sub-national level. The 
Boko Haram saga illustrates this point.414 Another example is the agitation for 
Islamic banking by some Muslim elites. If states shared any competence over 
banks or banking that agitation would probably have been limited within the 
confines of particular state polities and not spark a country-wide 
Christian/Muslim tension, as was the case. Consequently, federalism in Nigeria 
has not fully achieved conflict quarantine as Horowitz contemplates.415 
Over-centralization of powers at the national level has also occasioned the 
continued presence of most of the socio-political problems that led to the collapse 
of the first republic and the subsequent civil war. Particularly, the national 
government for its might remains attractive and thus, continues to be a battlefield 
for ethno-religious groups.416 Politicians who aspire to become benefactors for 
their ethnic groups recognize that such ambitions can only be achieved at the 
center.417 Consequently, national elections remain very problematic often 
culminating in violence, while national policies such as revenue allocation, 
rotational presidency, national census, and creation of new sub-federal units 
(states and local governments) are tensely contested along ethno-religious lines.418 
This chauvinism has heralded a “race to the presidency” situation in Nigeria 
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where every group seeks to assert itself at the center to avoid domination.419 
Without minimizing the intention to restore the pre-colonial religious order in the 
northern part of Nigeria that may have remotely driven the recent Shari’a 
expansion by some northern states, it is perhaps true that its immediacy had a 
political undertone.420 With the shift of the presidency to a southern Christian in 
1999, it became exigent for the Muslim North who had controlled federal powers 
since 1984 to find a basis for a renewed alliance and unity in order to guarantee 
their formidability in future presidential elections.421 
Over-centralization of powers has also resulted in a seeming struggle 
between the national government and those of the sub-states. The emergence of 
the Nigeria Governors’ Forum, an organization of Nigerian state governors in 
1999, and other like national and regional alignments was necessitated by the 
need to find a common front against the hegemony and dominance of the federal 
government.422 
With the creation of multi-federal sub-states and the increase in oil revenues 
came the restructuring of the revenue formula in Nigeria in the 1960s.423 The 
former order of transferring revenue to the place of derivation was abandoned for 
a central revenue formula, where revenues are transferred from the oil rich 
regions of the South to a Federal Account for redistribution to all sub-federal 
units.424 The resulting fiscal reality where sub-units obtain over eighty percent of 
their revenue from the central government has been described as a violation of 
one cardinal condition of fiscal efficiency, namely, that “the government that 
enjoys the pleasure of spending money must first experience the pain of 
extracting the money from the tax payers.”425 The result is lack of fiscal 
responsibility giving rise to unbridled corruption at the sub-federal tiers of 
governance and an absence of true sub-federal autonomy.426 This has also led to 
over dependence on oil especially as sub-states do little or nothing to generate 
internal revenues.427 Since the sub-units have become conduits for accessing 
central revenues, group agitations for the creation of more component units in the 
federation has soared and is always on the front burner of agitations that heat up 
the socio-polity.428 
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2. The Federal Character Principle and Indigeneity 
The constitutionally-derived federal character principle, which ordinarily 
may be hailed as a sublime means for ethno-religious balancing and a 
compensation for over-centralization, continues to attract controversies as to the 
appropriate modalities for its implementation.429 Perhaps even more problematic 
is the policy of indigeneity which is a corollary of the federal character 
principle.430 Indigeneity finds sub-state “citizenship” status derivable from origin 
rather than residence or birth in that sub-state.431 This practice is implicit in the 
constitutional provision, which ties the federal character principle to indigeneity, 
as defined above.432 Consequently, state and local government authorities adopt 
policies that discriminate against non-indigenes with respect to socio-political 
benefits.433 Specifically, since the right to access benefits at all levels of the 
federation is tied to origin from a specific state or local government area, as 
opposed to be being born or resident therein, most “settlers,” who may not be 
able to trace their origins elsewhere, are discriminated against in political 
appointments, access to education, and other government derived benefits.434 
There has been a number of inter-communal violence resulting from conflicts 
between indigenes (aborigines) and the so called “settlers” within the sub-federal 
units.435 Policies against non-indigenes have reduced the space for the enjoyment 
of a national citizenship especially with the proliferation of sub-states.436 In light 
of this, it becomes incongruous to imagine benign integration in a democratic 
Nigeria where people are confined to their units of origins for socio-political 
evolution. More so, it is difficult to reconcile the indigeneity provision or the 
discrimination that attends it with the constitutionally guaranteed rights of 
freedom from discrimination, freedom of movement, and freedom to own 
property anywhere in Nigeria.437 
3. Corruption 
No matter how cursory it may be, one cannot attempt a prognosis of any 
problem in Nigeria without taking note of the corrosive effect of corruption. 
Virtually all observers both within and outside Nigeria agree that corruption is a 
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major bane of socio-political problems in Nigeria.438 Ethnic loyalty matched with 
apathy towards the Nigerian state, especially in the immediate post-independence 
era, caused political leaders to perceive the center as an avenue to benefit their 
ethnic groups in the quest for political might and dominance.439 The result was 
unimaginable corruption (by way of misappropriation, looting, and 
embezzlement of public funds) and nepotism, especially with the profligacy that 
came with the oil boom of the 60s and 70s.440 The clandestine attitude of the 
military era and its utter disregard for due process further foisted on Nigeria a 
floodgate of impunity and financial recklessness. Four main factors contribute to 
the persistence of corruption in Nigeria today: ethnic loyalties, economic 
adversity, lack of honest leaders, and government control of the economy.441 
According to a popular Nigerian magazine, Time, the World Bank in 2006 
indicated that Nigeria had lost over $300 billion to corruption since its 
independence in 1960.442 The paralyzing effect of corruption has caused 
unimaginable economic disparity, leaving a significant number of citizens feeling 
forlorn and alienated. This directly contributes to the socio-political restiveness, 
especially as discontented and unemployed youths are readily available to turn 
deliberations concerning ethnicity or religion into inter-group violence and 
killings.443 Corruption has also caused a general administrative and bureaucratic 
paralysis in virtually all institutions of state leading to an inability of the system 
to respond adequately to issues whether of economic or socio-political concern. 
This dysfunction has created the laxity for all manner of anti-social extremism to 
thrive. 
G. Other Constitutional Models in Africa 
Two constitutional models in Africa alternative to the Nigerian integration 
model are worth some consideration, namely those of Ethiopia and South 
Africa.444 These states, like Nigeria, are composed of ethno-religious heterogeneity.445 
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In their recent history, Ethiopia and South Africa faced circumstances that warranted 
a consideration of how to engineer their constitutions to manage group 
fragmentation, ensure ethnic accommodation, and mitigate conflict. The result in 
both states in the mid-1990s was the adoption of federalism, consociational 
democracy, constitutional recognition of diversity, and a constitutional allowance for 
separate ethno-cultural evolutions. The constitutional recognition of ethnicity in these 
constitutions is significant for, as Selassie confirms, it was uncommon for ethnic 
diversity to receive official recognition in the pre-1990s political systems in Africa 
on the grounds that it embellished division and separatism.446 Thus, these models 
represent the post-colonial beginning of state attempts at constitutionally recognizing 
diversity in Africa. 
Lijphart suggests that for a federal state to be a consociation, it must possess 
the four qualities of consociation and, must have, in addition: a written 
constitution; a bicameral legislature at the national level; a division of powers 
between the federal and component states; pluralism as a nature; and 
democracy.447 Ethiopia and South Africa satisfy the latter five conditions and, in 
varying degrees, satisfy the four characteristics of consociation. 
1. Ethiopia 
The Federal Republic of Ethiopia (“FDRE”) practices an unprecedented 
ethnic federalism. The ethnic groups are segmented into nine autonomous states 
for self-government such that the demarcation of sub-national state territories 
coincides with specific ethnic groups.448 Each of these largely homogenous states 
variously termed “nations,” “nationalities,” and “peoples” are the primary means 
for expressing cultural, political, and linguistic identities of the major ethnic 
groups in the country.449 Interestingly, and in marked distinction to what obtains 
in most liberal constitutions where sovereign powers are proclaimed to reside 
with the entire people of the state, it is in these nations, nationalities, and peoples 
 
responsiveness of the political systems in Ethiopia and South Africa to their respective socio-political 
challenges including group fragmentation. The curiosity for the constitutional designs of these countries stems 
from the fact that they are among the very few countries in Africa with federal constitutions. Although South 
Africa does not describe itself as a federation, its constitution contains the hallmarks of federalism. More so, as 
sub-Sahara African states, Ethiopia and South Africa are characterized by extensive pluralism comparable to 
that of Nigeria.  
445. The World Factbook: Ethiopia, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/ 
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that the sovereign powers of the Ethiopian state reside.450 The FDRE Constitution 
ascribes to nations the unconditional right to self-determination, including the 
right to secession.451 The state and religion are declared separate and each is 
prohibited from interfering in the affairs of the other.452 By virtue of Article 5(1), 
all Ethiopian languages are given equal recognition.453 While Amharic is the 
working language of the national government, each component of the federation 
is constitutionally allowed to choose its own working language.454 This forms a 
part of the larger intention to foster, mobilize, and promote separate group ethno-
cultural priorities in a democratic Ethiopia.455 Therefore, by Article 39(2), every 
group has the right to promote its own culture and preserve its history.456 
Consequently, the constitution creates a confluence between affective (bound by 
emotions) and political communities (bound by a common decision making 
process).457 By ascribing the affective community with some measure of political 
significance, the constitution provides a means for achieving one of the main 
potentials of federalism in Africa—“accommodating ethnic diversity and 
fostering the values imbedded in ethnic community.”458 
Powers are distributed between the national government and those of the sub-
states in a relatively decentralized form.459 The federal government has legislative 
capacity over economic and social development, national standards and basic 
policy criteria for health and education, defense, federal police, foreign policy, 
foreign commerce, declaration of a state of emergency, immigration and granting 
of passports, copyright, standards for measurement and calendar, and possession 
and bearing of arms, while the sub-national units have powers in all areas not 
listed within federal legislative competence.460 Consequently, the constitution 
provides a vertical balance of powers by creating a legislative demarcation where 
national powers are limited to issues of national concern leaving the sub-state 
authorities with extensive powers to pursue their respective aspirations or matters 
of internal concern.461 This differs from the Nigerian case where the constitution 
seeks to retain state powers in the federal government leaving the sub-states as 
mere agents of execution rather than autonomous federal entities.462 Similarly, the 
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allowance for separate sub-national constitutions is significant, since it is likely 
to constitute a source of mobilization for the sub-national groups; this is in line 
with the principle of self-determination, the protection of which is an obvious 
aim of the constitution. 
The Constitution prescribes a parliamentary system of government with a 
bicameral legislature—the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the House of 
Federation.463 In fulfillment of consociational proportionality, Article 54 provides 
that the House of Peoples’ Representatives shall be composed of a maximum of 
550 members, and at least twenty of those membership seats are reserved for 
minority nationalities.464 Its functions consist of legislative, financial, 
deliberative, informative, and representative subjects.465 Membership in the 
House of Federation is largely determined by the sub-states’ councils within the 
constitutional parameters that allows for proportional representation.466 Each 
nation is entitled to a member and an additional one member for every one 
million of its population.467 
The President is the head of state and is nominated by the House of 
Representatives.468 His election is by two-thirds majority of a joint session of both 
legislative houses.469 The office of the President is mainly ceremonial. The Prime 
Minister is the head of government and must be elected from among members of 
the House of Representatives.470 He, together with the Council of Ministers, holds 
the highest executive powers of the state.471 “Powers of government shall be 
assumed by the political party or a coalition of political parties that constitutes a 
majority in the House of Peoples’ Representatives.”472 This coincides with 
consociational coalition, which Lijphart suggests can assure inter-ethnic 
cooperation and accommodation through its collegial decision making.473 
The FDRE, like Sudan and Nigeria, is multi-ethnic and religiously plural.474 
Of the about eighty ethnic groups, the Amhara, Tigray, and Oromo constitute the 
majority.475 Ethiopian statehood dates back to centuries of intermingling among 
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[2] OBEHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2013 11:16 AM 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 26 
467 
the groups.476 However, with the fall of its monarchy and the emergence of 
military rule in 1974, the problem of national integration, political legitimacy, 
ethnic mobilization, and identity soon became burning issues in its nation 
building.477 The ethnic content of these socio-political challenges was the 
dominance of the Amhara, which the other groups resented as eclipsing the 
fusion of ethnicities which the state was meant to represent. The result was the 
emergence of armed liberation struggles led primarily by the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (“TPLF”) and the Oromo Liberation Front (“OLF”).478 The main 
claims of these groups were neglect and marginalization.479 The Marxist military 
regime that ruled the country from 1974-91 allowed for ethnic expressions and 
subsequently granted autonomy to five out of thirty administrative regions.480 
With this freedom for ethnic expression came the opportunity for ethnic 
politicization and agitation especially as the granted autonomy was a mere 
delegation rather than a constitutional guarantee.481 With the activities of the 
TPLF and the OLF, the situation degenerated into a violent conflict which was 
exacerbated by the struggle for independence by Eritrea.482 Consequently, the 
idea of ethnic federalism came into the political process of the FDRE in 1991 
when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (“EPRDF”)—a 
coalition of four ethnic based parties—came into power.483 The EPRDF saw 
ethnic federalism as the only way to restructure the socio-political system to 
protect the hitherto oppressed groups, assure their self-determination, and 
enhance popular political participation in a post-military rule Ethiopia.484 The pro-
consociation model of constitution was consequently adopted in 1994.485 
2. South Africa 
South Africa, like most sub-Sahara Africa states is multi-ethnic and 
religiously diverse.486 One issue that was topical as South Africans envisaged 
their transition from minority rule—apartheid to democracy in the early 1990s—
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South Africa.487 Federalism was considered at this time with mixed feelings.488 
One of the major parties in the struggle against apartheid, the African National 
Congress (“ANC”), perceived federalism as potentially dispersing national 
powers that it felt was crucial to post-apartheid restructuring.489 However, support 
for federalism by other major parties and the fears of minority groups of a 
potential black African majoritarianism and dominance ensured the adoption of a 
federal-type structure with an elaborate Bill of Rights contained in Chapter 2 of 
the Constitution.490 It was the prediction of some observers that with the 
abrogation of apartheid, ethnic divisions among groups would become more 
prominent.491 Writers in recent scholarship, however, observe that events in South 
Africa, almost two decades after apartheid, continue to defy this prediction. They 
attribute this development partly to the country’s constitutional design for 
diversity management.492 
Although it nowhere describes itself as a federation, like Nigeria and 
Ethiopia, South Africa practices constitutional federalism, which originated from 
the Interim Constitution of 1993.493 The current National Constitution of 1996 
adopted the provisions of the Interim Constitution with few exceptions and 
segments the country into nine heterogeneous sub-national units called 
provinces.494 Although it has been said that the heterogeneity in states is to avoid 
separate developments that the former Bantustan system—or “ethnic homeland” 
system—stood for,495 it is also true that the non-geographical concentrations of 
the various groups contributed to the heterogeneity in provinces. These 
provinces, as in the case of Ethiopia, are designed to be autonomous with 
constitutional authority to adopt their own respective provincial constitutions 
subject to approval of the Constitutional Court.496 However, the national 
government retains the powers to set national standards and norms for the 
provinces to follow.497 By adopting a provincial constitution, the provinces may 
modify the default executive-legislative structures and processes for provinces 
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contained in the national constitution.498 There is also provision for a third federal 
“sphere” (level)—local government—which unlike most federal systems is a 
distinct federal sphere and is not subsumed under provincial jurisdiction.499 
The inter-relation among the vertical constituent “spheres” is based on 
cooperation rather than competition.500 There is no rigid separation of tasks or 
areas of authority.501 There are only few “exclusive” provincial powers contained 
in Schedule 4.502 The more critical issues are covered in the concurrent list— 
where both the national and provincial governments can legislate.503 In cases of 
conflicts between national and provincial laws with respect to Schedule 4, the 
constitution provides specific cases where national laws shall prevail over 
provincial legislation.504 These specific cases relate to the need for uniformity, the 
occasion of certain necessities, or, where the provincial law is prejudicial to other 
provinces or the national government in economic, health and security policies.505 
There are also specified cases where national legislation may prevail over 
provincial constitutions.506 For instance, where the subject of legislation is one 
determined by the national constitution to require a national legislation.507 This 
constitutional arrangement reflects an extensive decentralization of powers which 
grants the provinces the political competence to set and pursue priorities relevant 
to its subjects. 
Nonetheless, fiscal federalism in South Africa is centralized and revenue 
generated nationally among the national, provincial, and local spheres of 
government are distributed by national legislation based on equity, national 
interest, economic disparities among provinces, and other such criteria that are 
based on need.508 Borrowing powers of the sub-tier governments are also subject 
to national legislations.509 To foster cooperation among the various spheres of 
government, the constitution provides that spheres of government involved in an 
intergovernmental dispute must make “reasonable effort to settle the dispute by 
means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose, and must 
 
498. Id. §§ 142-43. 
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exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve the dispute.”510 
Where a court is not satisfied with the attempt at extra-judicial settlement, it may 
refer a dispute back to the organs of state involved.511 
The South African Constitution provides for parliamentary democracy with a 
bicameral legislature made up of the National Assembly (“NA”) and the National 
Council of Provinces (“NCOP”).512 In accordance with Lijphart’s idea of 
proportionality, the constitution provides that the NA “should” result in 
proportional representation and the NCOP is comprised of ten delegates from 
each province.513 The President is elected from the NA as the head of state and 
government and appoints his/her entire cabinet except a maximum of two from 
the NA.514 However, the lack of a coalition (as envisaged by consociation) in the 
executive cabinet in recent times has been attributed to the popularity of the 
ANC, which continues to dominate elections in post-apartheid South Africa.515 
Yet, to guide against national dominance over the provinces in the integrated 
policy formations at the center, the second chamber of parliament, the NCOP, 
made up of ministers of provincial governments, play a role in national 
legislating.516 In case of national legislations directly affecting provinces, each 
delegate votes as a block on instructions from their provincial legislature, and the 
NA can only overturn its decision by a super majority.517 Although Lijphart 
prescribes homogeneity in sub-states, it appears that the latter provision of the ten 
delegates constituting a block when voting on issues directly affecting the 
provinces gives the heterogonous province some form of homogeneity at the 
national legislature.518 The prospect for coalitions in the national cabinet was 
more enhanced in the 1993 Interim Constitution, which produced a government 
of national unity. By sections 84 and 88 of that Constitution, any party that won 
twenty percent of the seats in the NA was entitled to produce the Vice President, 
and any party with five percent of the seats in the NA was entitled to be 
represented in the cabinet.519 However, with that transition era now gone, the 
South African government currently reflects a Westminster parliamentary 
model.520 
South African federalism, like that of Nigeria, is devolutionary—sub-units 
were preceded by a unitary structure. However, recognizing the need to create 
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space for separate ethno-cultural evolutions and to guarantee the rights of 
minorities especially with the white population now out of power, the South 
African constitution allows for ethnic identification, preservation and 
advancement.521 Thus, the South African constitution joins that of Ethiopia in 
affirming diversity, accommodating ethnic interests and promoting separate 
ethno-cultural advancement. The difference is that while the constitution of 
Ethiopia is built on ethnic federalism, using the ethnic groups as the units of self-
determination, the South African model rejects ethnic groups as distinctive 
federating units and ascribes to them no political power.522 The Constitution 
guarantees ethnic self-determination523 and by section 6 it provides for eleven 
official languages in the country of which the national and states governments 
may adopt any two as its official languages.524 There is religious freedom, the 
observance of which may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions. 
H. Relevance of the Ethiopian and South African Constitutional Models to 
Nigeria 
As indicated above, additional research will be required to examine the 
practical successes—adaptability and responsiveness—of the Ethiopian and 
South African constitutions to the socio-political realities in those countries, for 
factors beyond design which influence the working of a constitution have not 
been taken into account here. Nonetheless, these constitutions offer some 
potential for group co-existence and conflict mitigation for a similarly divided 
state like Nigeria. 
First, to counteract the problem of over-centralization and national 
dominance, which pose serious challenges to the Nigerian political system, the 
South African and Ethiopian constitutions offer two alternative options for 
balancing the vertical distribution of powers. On the one hand, is the quite typical 
Ethiopian model of restricting the powers of the federal government to issues of 
national concern, while leaving the sub-states with powers to address issues that 
are of internal concern. On the other hand, is the German style, an integrated 
federalism model that is practiced in South Africa where both the national and 
sub-national governments both play a role in national and provincial lawmaking, 
the modality of which is dependent on whether the subject of legislation is one 
affecting the provinces directly, or the nation as a whole. Perhaps, this innovation 
became attractive in South Africa since there was the desire to avoid the notion 
of separate developments that was associated with the apartheid era. In other 
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words, the fear that provinces would develop separately from one another 
necessitated an integrated legislature—where legislative jurisdictions are not 
rigidly separated—to ensure cooperation and balance. 
Second, closely related to power distribution between the national and sub-
national governments is the issue of sub-national constitutions. Where powers are 
adequately distributed vertically in a federal system, the role of a sub-national 
constitution cannot be over-emphasized. As Schuck tells us, constitutionalism is 
one form of “glue” for nations-peoples.525 The current federal set up in Nigeria, 
where the attempt is to foster diverse group aspirations by a single document, 
perhaps, underrates the depth and nature of diversity in the country. Sub-national 
constitutions derived from a framework provided by a national constitution as 
with Ethiopia, and South Africa, can give political significance to sub-states, to 
allow for effective group mobilization within sub-state polities and thus foster 
separate groups’ aspirations and priorities. 
Third, as said above, the Ethiopian and South African constitutions officially 
recognize diversity. The Ethiopian constitution allows for separate ethno-cultural 
and political evolutions by using the groups as units for self-government. South 
Africa recognizes diversity and allows for separate ethno-cultural development 
and preservation, but grants no political powers to the groups. The Nigerian 
constitution aligns with the typical African approach to diversity, in which case it 
sorts to disguise or transcend group division in the name of national unity and 
integration. Events in Nigeria post-1999 show conflicts in the respective groups’ 
aspirations. Dramatic increase in inter-group conflicts in the last decade proves 
that differences in groups’ aspirations were only suppressed by the dictatorship 
of the military era. If the hope is for democracy to continue to legitimize the 
political machinery in Nigeria, then the expectation should be that its attendant 
freedom will continue to foster divergent or even conflicting groups’ aspirations. 
The current challenge is found in the attempt to address conflicting group 
aspirations by a single government (the federal government). Chances that the 
federal government can respond to the various priorities of the groups without 
leaving one group dissatisfied are slim. 
Fourth, the parliamentary system of government provided by the Ethiopian 
and South Africa constitutions contemplates a coalition of groups in the 
executive arm of government. The presidential system of government as 
practiced in Nigeria, may not, by itself, be problematic where, as in the case of 
Nigeria, it includes a broadly representative legislature and a multi-party 
electoral system. However, with over-centralization of powers at the national 
level, the presidency has become symbolic of political might rather than of unity 
and continues to exacerbate unhealthy competition and rivalry among the groups. 
Where the sub-states have the powers to guarantee respective group aspirations 
and politico-economic developments, the result would be for politicians to be less 
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attracted to the center, and thus, the political tussle is likely to disperse and 
become localized in several local polities. Socio-political tensions that might 
emanate from such sub-state polities can be better managed since the sub-states 
are comprised of either homogenous groups or relatively few heterogeneous 
groups. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The considerations for assessing whether a group can exercise its right to 
self-determination by way of secession serve two purposes. First, as has been 
considered here, they serve to legitimize secession under the international law 
principle of self-determination. Second, these considerations serve to draw the 
recognition of the international community to the justification and exigency for a 
group to exercise its right to self-determination. The role of the international 
community cannot be exaggerated in issues of secessionist self-determination for, 
as Horowitz points out, whether a secessionist movement will achieve its aims is 
determined largely by international politics, the balance of interests, and forces 
beyond the state.526 The role of the international community to the independence 
of Eritrea and South Sudan further proves this proposition. To envisage secession 
without these considerations is to face yet another war in Nigeria as was the case 
with the Nigerian civil war, the civil war of Sudan, and many other states in 
Africa where there are armed struggle for independence. 
The current case by case approach of the Nigerian Government to the issue 
of ethno-religious tension and conflict neglects the root causes of the problem. 
The attempt in Nigeria to suppress ethnic and other group affiliations and loyalty 
under the guise of national integration has, over the years, proved to be 
pretentious of the country’s socio-political realities. The events that have 
unfolded in the country since the return to civil rule make it difficult to hope that 
the federal government would surmount the trajectory of divergent group 
aspirations and priorities and ultimately foster national integration. 
With African leaders recently, in 2010, at the 5th International Conference on 
Federalism held in Addis Ababa, committing to federalism pacesetting, states 
like Nigeria hold the mantle of hope for an era of power devolution and 
democratic consolidation in Africa. They constitute the spectacle through which 
federalism and other prodemocracy type political structures will be viewed if not 
measured in a region coming from inordinate authoritarianism and repressive 
dictatorship. However, no system of government will command optimism in 
Africa if, in practical terms, it does not adequately manage ethno-religious 
fragmentation, contain intergroup conflict, and ultimately foster socio-economic 
development. At this point, where more than its predecessor, the AU, is showing 
greater commitments to democracy and good governance, Nigeria, as one of the 
 
526. HOROWITZ, supra note 11, at 230. 
[2] OBEHI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2013 11:16 AM 
2013 / Between Secession and Federalism 
474 
few federations in Africa, should be concerned with what reforms to adopt in the 
hope of achieving sublime inter-group accommodation, peaceful co-existence, 
and conflict mitigation. This should form the beginning of further thoughts on 
political alternatives for stability and group coexistence in Nigeria and indeed 
Africa. 
 
